Damage Liability of Public Employee Unions for Illegal Strikes by Egan, Barbara J
Boston College Law Review
Volume 23
Issue 4 Number 4 Article 5
7-1-1982
Damage Liability of Public Employee Unions for
Illegal Strikes
Barbara J. Egan
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information,
please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Barbara J. Egan, Damage Liability of Public Employee Unions for Illegal Strikes, 23 B.C.L. Rev. 1087
(1982), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol23/iss4/5
DAMAGE LIABILITY OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEE
UNIONS FOR ILLEGAL STRIKES
Although Congress has comprehensively regulated private sector and
federal employee labor relations,' its legislation has not extended to state,
county or municipal employees. 2 Consequently, each state can regulate its
public employees as it sees fit. The resulting state legislation in this area varies
widely, ranging from complete statutory silences to complex regulatory
schemes.' Currently, thirty states prohibit public employee strikes by statute.'
Statutes in eight states permit strikes by certain classes of public employees. 6 In
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. SS 151-69 (1976), as
amended by the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. SS 141-87 (1976),
governs private sector employees. Federal employees are regulated by 5 U.S.C. SS 7301-52
(1976).
2 See 29 U.S.C. 55 152(2), 152(3) (1976).
Furthermore, it is unlikely that the federal government will enact legislation regulating
these employees, since in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), the Supreme
Court indicated that such legislation would encroach on the states' constitutional right to regulate
their own affairs. Note, Public Sector Strikes: Will the Illinois Legislature Answer the Challenge?, 1980 U.
ILL, L. F. 869, 880-81.
' E.g., Arizona, Arkansas, West Virginia.
4 E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. 5 34:13A(1)-(21) (West 1965 & Supp. 1981); N.Y. CIV. SERV.
LAW SS 200-14 (McKinney 1973 & Supp. 1981).
5 These state statutes prohibit strikes by all public employees, or all classes of public
employees that are covered by the collective bargaining laws: ALA, CODE S 11-43-143 (1977)
(firemen); CAL. LAB. CODE 5 1962 (West 1971) (firemen); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 5 7-475
(West 1972 & Supp. 1981); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, 5 1312 (1977); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. S 4-125
(police) and 5 4-407 (firemen) (West 1966); FLA. STAT. ANN. S 447.505 (West 1981); GA. CODE
ANN. 5 54-1302 (1974) (firemen) and 5 89-1301 (1980) (state); IOWA CODE ANN. S 20.12 (West
1978); KAN. STAT. ANN. S 75.4333(c)(5) (1977); KY. REV. STAT. 5 78.470 (1980) (police) and
345.130 (1977) (firemen); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, 55 964(2)(c), 979(C)(2)(c) (1974); MD.
EDUC. CODE ANN. 5 6-410(A) (1978); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 150E, S 9A (West Supp.
1981); MICH. STAT. ANN. 5 17.455(2) (Callaghan 1975); Mo. ANN. STAT. S 105.530 (Vernon
Supp. 1982); NEB. REV. STAT. 5 48.821 (1978); NEV. REV. STAT. 5 288.230 (1977); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. S 273-A:13 (1978); 2 Pub. Employee Bargaining Rep. (CCH) 1 24,523 (March 31,
• 1978) (citing "N.M. Regulations for Labor-Management Relations in the Classified Service");
N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW S 210 (McKinney 1973); N.D. CENT. CODE 5 15-38.1-14 (1981)
(teachers); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 5 4117.02 (Baldwin 1981) (police and firemen); R.I. GEN.
LAWS SS 28-9.1-12, 28-9.2-12, 28-9.3-1, 28-9.4-16 (1979); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 5 3-18-10
(1980); TENN. CODE ANN. 5 7-56-109 (1980); TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5154c,
5154c-1(17) (Vernon 1971 & Supp. 1981); UTAH CODE ANN. 5 34-20a-5 (Supp. 1981) and
11-20-31 (1973); VA. CODE 5 40.1-55 (1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 5 41.56.120 (1972).
6 In the following states "essential" public employees cannot strike: ALASKA STAT, S
23.40.200 (1972) (policemen, firemen, correction and hospital personnel); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
43, 5 1101.1001 (Purdon Supp. 1981) (guards at prisons and mental hospitals, and court person-
nel). The following states prohibit public employee stokes where . they would endanger the
public's health, safety or welfare: ALASKA. STAT. S 23.40.200 (1972); HAWAII REV. STAT. 5 89-12
(Supp. 1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. 55 179.63(11), 179.64(1) (West Supp. 1981); OR. REV. STAT. 5
243.726 (1979); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, S 1101.1003 (Purdon Supp. 1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
21, 5 1730(3) (1978). In Idaho, firemen are prohibited from striking only during the term of the
collective bargaining agreement. IDAHO CODE 5 44-1811 (1977); In Wisconsin, municipal
employees only have a limited right to strike, Wis. STAT. ANN. S 1.70(4X1) (West Supp. 1981).
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the remaining states, which have no applicable statutes, the legality of a public
employee strike is a common law question for the courts
In the event of an illegal public employee strike, the states have provided
various measures, either by statute or at common law, to deal with the striking
unions. These measures are available primarily to public employers and not to
third parties. Employer remedies include injunctions, 9
 dismissal of striking
employees, 9
 fines," loss of dues check-off," and decertification of the union."
These measures, however, have failed to diminish the number of illegal strikes
by public employees." This failure may be due to the impracticality, inade-
quacy or uselessness of many of the available measures. For example, the
dismissal of striking employees may be an impractical sanction where the
employees, such as policemen and firemen, are highly trained and provide
essential services which the public cannot do. without while replacements are
being trained.' 4
 An injunction also may be useless where the strike lasts only a
short time, yet causes considerable damage." Furthermore, even mandatory
fines may provide ineffective deterrence where a union hopes to achieve finan-
cial gains from the strike that will outweigh the cost of paying the fine." Even
where the available measures would penalize the union harshly, a public
employer might decline to exercise such harsh sanctions in order not to an-
7
 The following states have not yet addressed the issue at common law: Arizona, Col-
orado, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, West Virginia, Wyoming.
Although there are no West Virginia statutes or cases on point, public employee strikes have
been held to be illegal in West Virginia in U.S. Dept. of Labor Summary of Public Sector Labor
Relations Policies, 1976, at 121.
In one state, the cases allow strikes by those classes of public employees not specifically
prohibited from striking: State ex. rel Dept. of Hwys. v. Public Employees Craft Council, 165
Mont. 349, 355, 529 P.2d 785, 788 (1974). The common law of other states prohibits public
employee strikes: City of Fort Smith v. Arkansas State Council No. 38, 245 Ark. 409, 410, 433
S.W.2d 153, 154 (1968); City of Pana v. Crowe, 57 I11.2d 547, 550-53, 316 N.E.2d 513, 514-16
(1974); Board of Educ. v. New Jersey Educ. Ass'n, 53 N.J. 29, 36-7, 247 A.2d 867, 871 (1968).
8 See,	 N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW 5 211 (McKinney 1973); Wis. STAT. ANN. $
111.89(1) (West Supp. 1981).
9 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. 5 447.507(5) (West 1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. $ 179.64(2)
(1981).
'° See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. 5 447.507(6)(a)(4) (West 1981); NEV. REV. STAT.
288.250(1)(a) (1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, 5 51-113 (West 1978).
" See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, 5 4011(b) (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. 5
447.507(6)(a)(3) (West 1981); MD. EDUC. CODE ANN. 5 6-410(b)(2) (1978).
17 See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. 5 20.12(5) (West 1978); MD. EDUC. CODE ANN.
6-410(b)(1) (1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. 5 179.64(6) (West Supp. 1981).
" The number of public employee work stoppages since 1965 have been as follows:
1965 - 42; 1966 - 142; 1967 -	 181; 1968 - 254; 1969 - 411; 1970 - 412; 1971 - 329; 1972 - 375;
1973 -387; 1974 - 384; 1975 - 478; 1976 - 378; 1977 - 413; 1978 - 481; 1979 - 593; GOV'T EMPL.
REL. REP. (BNA) 71:1014 (1981).
" Wohlers, One Strike and You May be Out: The Legal Realities of the Hardball Game of Fire
Fighter and Police Strikes, 15 IDAHO L. REV. 39,55 (1978).
" See Burke & Thomas, Inc. v. International Org. of Masters, 92 Wash.2d 762,
763-65, 600 P.2d 1282, 1283-84 (1977) (a two-day strike by public ferry workers ended before an
injunction could be obtained, yet inflicted great damage on local businesses).
18 Comment, Collective Bargaining for Public Employees and the Prevention of Strikes in the
Public Sector, 68 MICH. L. REV. 260, 294 n.169 (1969).
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tagonize the union and further disrupt the employer/union relationship."
Since most sanctions and remedies created by the state courts and legislatures
have been accorded to public employers, a union therefore might escape
punishment for an illegal strike if the public employer foregoes the available
measures.' 8
In contrast to the foregoing measures, granting damage actions to public
employers and third parties against public employee unions would effectively
deter the unions from illegally striking." Granting damage actions would deter
unions from engaging in strikes which cause widespread harm because such
strikes could result in enormous judgments against them. 2° Even short strikes
can cause substantial damage" and result in large judgments against a union.
" In withholding a damage remedy from a public employer, the Michigan Supreme
Court expressed the fear that "kin fact, the institution of a civil damage suit may very well lead
instead to another strike and thereby cause a further suspension of services." Lamphere Schools
v. Lamphere Fed'n of Teachers, 67 Mich. App. 331, 343 n.10, 240 N.W,2d 792, 799 n.10
(1976), aff'd, 400 Mich. 104, 252 N.W.2d 818 (1979). See also Comment, Collective Bargaining for
Public Employees and the Prevention of Strikes in the Public Sector, 68 MICH, L. REV. 260, 293 (1969) (if
"the union possesses the preponderance of power, the employer would be unlikely to invoice the
damage remedy for fear of exacerbating relations[;)").
" A few states, however, by statute or case law permit members of the public to seek in-
junctions against illegally striking unions if the appropriate public officials refuse to do so. See,
e:g., Burke & Thomas, Inc. v. International Org. of Masters, 92 Wash.2d 762, 776, 600 P.2d
1282, 1290 (1979); IOWA CODE ANN. § 20.12(3) (West 1978).
"' Large. damage judgments could "effectively bankrupt striking unions and eliminate
the gains that organized employees have so far secured in the public sector collective bargaining
context." Jackson, Public Employer Countermeasures to Union Concerted Activity: An Analysis of Alter-
natives, 8 J.L. & EDUC. 73, 98 (1979).
See also id. at 87 (civil damages might help prevent strikes); State v. Kansas City Fire
Fighters Local 42, 2 Pub. Bargaining Cas. (CCH) 120,438, at 21,471-72 (Mo. Cir. Ct. 1976)
(court awarded punitive as well as compensatory damages in a third party suit, in order to deter
public unions from striking).
20 In Burns, Jackson, Miller, Summit & Spitzer v. Lindner, 1980-81 Pub. Bargaining
Cas. (CCH) T 37,253 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. March 31, 1981) (motion to dismiss denied), the plaintiffs
asked for damages of $50 million a day for each of the eleven days of the strike. The union's at-
torney has stated that if the court awards the requested damages, "the unions are out of
business." Podgers, Sue NYC Transit Unions for Strike Disruptions, 67 A.B.A. J. 690 (1981); Prece-
dent Sought in Public Worker Strikes, 66 A.B.A. J. 549 (1980). See also Arouca, Damages for Unlawful
Strikes Under the Railway Labor Act, 32 HAST. L. J. 779,817 (1981) ("There will be less incentive for
labor to avoid striking if concessions can be secured through an unlawful strike without attendant
monetary liability.").
It has been argued, however, that civil damage actions by employers will not deter
public employees from striking: "Many labor lawyers question whether private damage suits
would dampen the apparently increasing willingness of public employee unions to strike." One
labor lawyer maintained that "union members 'believe their principles are right' and private
damage suits 'are not something that will force them to sacrifice those principles.' " Podgers,
supra, at 690. See also Comment, Collective Bargainingfor Public Employees and the Prevention of Strikes in
the Public Sector, 68 MICH. L. REV. 260, 293 (1969) (while it is necessary to increase the costs of
striking in order to deter public employees from engaging in illegal strike(s), employer damage
suits would probably not have that effect). ("In situations in which the union possesses the
preponderance of power, the employer would be unlikely to invoke the damage remedy for fear
of exacerbating relations, ").
" For example, the strike by ferry workers in Burke & Thomas, Inc. v. International
Org. of Masters, 92 Wash.2d 762, 764-65, 600 P.2d 1282, 1284 (1979), lasted only two days, but
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Thus, the fear of damage suits would deter public employee unions from
engaging in short strikes, against which injunctive relief is useless, as well as
long strikes. Of course, a damage action, even if more effective and useful than
other measures, might be as much against a public employer's best interests as
other measures. After a strike, an employer may wish to return to a har-
monious working relationship with its employees as quickly as possible. A
damage suit brought by an employer probably would cause resentment among
the employees and interfere with the reestablishment of a good working rela-
tionship with the union. 22
 A public employer's refusal to bring suit against the
union for an illegal strike, however, should not prevent third parties from suing
for damages. Permitting third party damage suits would compensate injured
plaintiffs while achieving the deterrent effect sacrificed by public employers
who forego damages and other remedies in order to maintain industrial har-
mony.
Although providing damage actions to employers and third parties would
significantly deter public unions from illegally striking, 23
 few state statutes ex-
pressly provide this remedy to public employers," and at present, no state
statute expressly authorizes a third party damage action. Nevertheless, public
employers and third parties have several possible theories of recovery against
public unions. These theories of recovery include the implication of a damage
action from a statute prohibiting public employee strikes, as well as various tort
and contract theories. A public employer's or third party's success in pursuing
because it occurred on an important holiday weekend the plaintiff businesses claimed to have suf-
fered more than $1 million in damages.
22
 Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 248 (1970)
(stating that a damage suit by an employer either during or after the strike will only delay resolu-
tion and aggravate employer-union difficulties). See also Comment, Parent Union Liability for Strikes
in Breach of Contract, 67 CAL. L. REV. 1028, 1032 (1979). Although the comment deals with con-
tract suits brought pursuant to S 301 of the federal Labor Management Relations Act, the situa-
tion is analogous:
A rational employer may forego a tenable — even a strong — section 301 damage
suit in order to preserve harmonious relations with a union and its officials . . . .
Post-strike damage suits impair this industrial harmony. Acrimony developed dur-
ing a strike may not dissipate if a damage action is pending for months, perhaps
years, after the strike ends.
Id. See also infra text and note at note 41.
23 See supra text and notes at notes 19-21.
24
 Three states explicitly provide public employers with a contract damage remedy:
ALASKA STAT. 5 23.40.020 (1972); IOWA CODE ANN. S 20.17(5) (West 1978); KY. REV. STAT. S
345.100(3) (1977). Five other states have enacted general provisions for employer damage suits
against public unions: IND. CODE ANN. S 20-7.5-1-14(b) (Burns 1975) (school employers,
through any proper proceeding at law or in equity, may take action against teacher's organiza-
tions which strike illegally); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. S 273-A:15 (1977) ("Actions by or against
the exclusive representative of a [public employee] bargaining unit may be brought, without
respect to the amount of damages, in the superior court. . ."). See also FLA. STAT. ANN. S
447.507(4) (West 1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. 5 179.68-3(11) and S 179.68-1 (West Supp. 1981);
WIS. STAT. ANN. S 111.89(2)(c) (West 1974) (authorizing damage suits by an employer in the
event of a public employee strike, without specifying whether the cause of action is in tort or con-
tract).
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these remedies will depend on such factors as the nature of a state's regulation
of public employees and the state law regarding the different remedies.
This note will analyze the various theories of recovery available to public
employers and third parties suing illegally striking public employee unions for
damages. First it will discuss whether a statute prohibiting public employee
strikes should provide the basis for the implication of a damage action for viola-
tion of the prohibition. Then the note will address whether a state's statutory
scheme regulating public employees bespeaks a legislative intent to provide the
exclusive remedies against striking public employee unions. Next, the various
tort theories under which public employers and aggrieved third parties can sue
public unions will be examined. The discussion will reveal that courts have dif-
fered in their treatment of these tort theories of recovery. Finally, the different
contractual claims against public unions which may be available to public
employers and third parties will be discussed. An assessment of the viability of
these contractual claims, and a discussion of the reasons for permitting or de-
nying them, will follow. It will be submitted that unless a state legislature has
indicated that it has provided exclusive remedies against illegally striking
public employee unions, courts should be willing to allow statutory, tort and
contract causes of action against these unions. By not placing formalistic
restrictions on the availability to public employers and third parties of a
statutory, tort and contract theories of recovery against public employee
unions, courts would further the state's policy behind the prohibition of public
employee strikes.
I. STATUTORY ISSUES IN DAMAGE SUITS BY PUBLIC EMPLOYERS
AND THIRD PARTIES
The nature of state statutes governing public employee labor relations
often will determine whether a court recognizes a private damage action in
favor of public employers or third parties who suffer harm from an illegal pub-
lic employee strike. 25 Upon examining the state's statutory scheme regulating
public employees, a court could reach three different conclusions: (1) if the
statute does not expressly provide a damage action, a court nonetheless may
decide to imply one from the statute prohibiting strikes; 26 (2) a court instead
might regard the statutory scheme as evidence of a legislative intent to preempt
the area of public employee labor relations;" under this view, the legislation
35 See, e.g., Lamphere Schools v. Lamphere Fed'n of Teachers, 400 Mich. 104, 110-24,
252 N.W.2d 818, 821-27 (1977) (in deciding a statutory issue, a court must first determine the
legislative intent which is controlling); Burke & Thomas, Inc. v. International Org. of Masters,
92 Wash.2d 762, 770-75, 600 P.2d 1282, 1287-90 (1979) (court looked to statutory scheme and
policies in deciding whether to create a new remedy under the statute); Jamur Prods. Corp. v.
Quill, 51 Misc.2d 501, 506, 273 N.Y.S.2d 348, 352-53 (1966) (interpreted legislative failure to
provide third party damage remedy as statement of public policy; therefore refused to imply
damage remedy).
26 See infra text and notes at notes 29-132.
27 See infra text and notes at notes 133-66.
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would occupy the field and preclude all remedies not explicitly provided by the
legislature; (3) finally, a court could decide that the statutory scheme warrants
neither the implication of a damage action nor the application of the preemp-
tion doctrine. If a court reaches this final conclusion, employer and third party
claims based on tort or contract theories still would be available. 28 In deciding
how to interpret the statutory scheme, such factors as the statutory language,
the legislative history, the need for a damage action, and the public policies
underlying the legislation should be considered. Courts' analyses of these fac-
tors may differ depending upon whether a public employer or a third party is
bringing suit. Therefore, in exploring each possible approach a court could
take towards a statutory scheme, public employer and third party claims will be
examined separately.
A. Implying a Cause of Action for Damages
1. The Implication Doctrine: An Overview
The doctrine of implied causes of action provides a possible theory of
recovery for either public employers or third parties against a public employee
union which illegally strikes. Under this doctrine, a court may imply a civil
right of action from a statute which does not expressly authorize that action 29
Since the court implies the action from a statute, this theory of recovery is
available to employers or third parties only in states which prohibit public
employee strikes by statute. The judicial practice of implying causes of action
derives from the common law principle that where the law provides a right, it
also will afford a remedy." In seeking to implement this principle, courts have
weighed a wide range of competing considerations, and have fashioned some of
these considerations into various tests for the implication of remedies. As enun-
ciated by the United States Supreme Court, the current standard for the im-
29 See infra text and notes at notes 167-68.
29 See generally Note, Implied Causes of Action in the State Courts, 30 STAN. L. REV. 1243
(1978) (discusses the implication of causes of action in the state courts). For a discussion of im-
plied rights of action under federal statutes, see Siegel, The Implication Doctrine and the Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices Act, 79 COL. L. Rev. 1085, 1085-1104 (1979); Note, Implying Civil Remedies from
Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77 HARV. L. REV, 285 (1963); Hazen, Implied Private Remedies Under
Federal Statutes: Neither a Death Knell Nor a Moratorium — Civil Rights, Securities Regulation, and Beyond,
33 VAND. L. REV. 1333 (1980).
'° See Couch v. Steel, 118 Eng. Rep. 1193, 1196 (Q. B. 1854); Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v.
Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916):
A disregard of the command of [a] statute is a wrongful act, and where it results in
damage to one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted, the
right to recover the damages from the party in default is implied, according to a
doctrine of the common law ... : "[I]n every case, where a statute enacts, or pro-
hibits a thing for the benefit of a person, he shall have a remedy upon the same
statute for the thing enacted for his advantage, or for the recompense of a wrong
done to him contrary to the said law." . This is but an application of the max-
im, Ubi jus ibi remedium.
Id. at 39-40 (citing 1 COM. DIG. 248 (1762)). See also J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426,
433-34 (1964); Fitzgerald v. Pan Am. World Airways, 229 F.2d 499, 501 (2d Cir. 1956).
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plication of a private cause of action under a federal statute involves the ascer-
tainment of legislative intent." Under this test, a cause of action will be im-
plied only if the Court determines that Congress intended the action to be
available to the party requesting it. 32 The court begins the inquiry by looking to
the statutory language for evidence of a congressional intent either to grant or
to deny the cause of action. 33 If the language of the statute does not reveal the
intent of Congress, the court then will consider the legislative history of the
statute," the regulatory scheme provided in the statute," and whether the
plaintiff is a member of the class of persons for whose special benefit the statute
was enacted. 36 In looking to these factors, however, the court will not imply a
private damage action from a federal statute merely because it would be a
logical or desirable supplement to the statutory scheme." Absent some indica-
tion that Congress intended to provide the cause of action, the court will not
imply it.
State courts construing state statutes, however, need not comply with the
standard formulated by the Supreme Court for implied rights of action." In
fact, the Supreme Court's approach generally would be of little use to state
courts. Many state statutes have little or no legislative history, and it is difficult
to determine legislative intent solely through an examination of the text of the
statute." State courts thus have been free to formulate their own standards for
the implication of causes of action. Under these standards, clear evidence of
legislative intent generally would be controlling." Lacking such evidence,
however, many state courts look to other factors in deciding whether to imply a
remedy. Generally, they will imply one under two conditions. First, the
legislature must have enacted the statute for the special benefit of a class of
which the plaintiff is a member:" Second, the implication of a cause of action
3 See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 101 S. Ct.
2615, 2622 (1981); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16 (1979).
32 See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575-76 (1979); Transamerica
Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15 (1979).
Former Supreme Court decisions did not emphasize legislative intent to this extent. For
example, in J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964), the Court emphasized the necessi-
ty of an implied cause of action as a means of effectuating the purposes of the statute. In Cort v.
Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975), the Court again looked to factors other than legislative intent in
deciding whether to imply a remedy. 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
33 Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 101 S. Ct.
2615, 2623 (1981); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16 (1979);
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979).
34 Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 101 S. Ct.
2615, 2623 (1981); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 571 (1979).
35 Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 101 S. Ct.
2615, 2623 (1981).
36 Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 569-70 (1979).
37 Id. at 578.
38 See Stanford Note, supra note 29, at 1252-53.
" Id. at 1252.
4° See, e.g., id. at 1253 n.49; Lamphere Schools v. Lamphere Fed'n of Teachers, 400
Mich. 104, 110, 252 N.W.2d 818, 821 (1977).
4 ' See, e.g., Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Co., 270 N.Y. 287, 305, 200 N.E.
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must aid in the enforcement of and further the policies behind the statute. 42
Since many of the state statutes prohibiting public employee strikes specify
neither the class for whose benefit the strike prohibition was enacted nor the
policies behind the prohibition, the answer to the two inquiries of this test
generally must depend on the rationale behind the statute. That rationale will
indicate whom the legislature intended to benefit and what goals it hoped to
achieve by enacting the statute. Various rationales may underlie the prohibi-
tion of public employee strikes. Under one rationale, a strike prohibition is
meant to insure the uninterrupted provision of services to the public, which
suffers the harm or inconvenience caused by such strikes." The members of
the public who would be subject to such harm or inconvenience would be the
intended beneficiaries of the statute. Thus, under such a statute, third parties
harmed by public employee strikes should be accorded a private right of action.
Allowing a third party action would further the policies behind this strike pro-
hibition by compensating those people the legislature sought to benefit and by
preventing future violations of the statute.
Another common rationale underlying the prohibition of public employee
strikes is that granting the freedom to strike would give too much bargaining
power to the public employee unions. 44 This unacceptable bargaining power
would arise from two factors. First, the demand for public sector services is in-
elastic. The public cannot replace many governmental services, such as police
and fire protection, with substitute services from the private sector." Further-
more, the government need not make a profit. This lack of a profit motive, and
the constant public need for government services, increase the coercive power
of a strike, since the market forces of supply and demand and the need for prof-
it would not restrain union demands for higher pay or better benefits." The
824, 829 (1936); Motyka v. City of Amsterdam, 15 N . Y.2d 134, 139, 204 N.E.2d 635, 637
(1965); Jenkins v. J.C. Penney Casualty Ins. Co., 280 S.E.2d 252, 254 (W. Va. 1981) (citing
Hurley v. Allied Chem. Corp., 262 S.E.2d 757, 763 (W. Va. 1980)); Sherman v. Field Clinic, 74
App.3d 21, 29, 392 N.E.2d 154, 160-61 (1979); 4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S
874A (1977).
42 See, e.g., Sellinger v. Freeway Mobile Home Sales, Inc., 110 Ariz. 573, 576, 521
P.2d 1119, 1122 (1974); McNeal v. Allen, 95 Wash.2d 265, 621 P.2d 1285, 1292 (1980); Young
v. Joyce, 351 A.2d 857, 859 (Del. 1975). In 4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS $ 874A
(1977), the test for implication is described as follows:
When a legislative provision protects a class of persons by proscribing or requiring
certain conduct but does not provide a civil remedy for the violation, the court
may, if it determines that the remedy is appropriate in furtherance of the purpose
of the legislation and needed to assure the effectiveness of the provision, accord to
an injured member of the class a right of action, using a suitable existing tort ac-
tion or a new cause of action analogous to an existing tort action.
43
 Lamphere Schools v. Lamphere Fed'n of Teachers, 400 Mich. 104, 128, 252
N.W.2d 818, 829 (1977). See also Wohlers, supra note 14, at 46.
" See Comment, Strikes by Public Employees: The Consequence of Legislative Inattention, 20
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 945, 949 (1980); Edwards, The Developing Labor Relations Law in the Public
Sector, 10 DUQ. L. REV. 357, 361-62 (1971-72); Note, Private Damage Actions Against Public Sector
Unions for Illegal Strikes, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1309, 1315 (1978).
43 Harvard Note, supra note 44, at 1315 n.26.
" Comment, Strikes by Public Employees: The Consequence of Legislative Inattention, 20 SAN-
TA CLARA L. REV. 415, 949 (1980); Edwards, supra note 44, at 361-62.
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second reason for which a right to strike would give public unions unacceptable
bargaining power is that public officials with an interest in reelection may agree
to unreasonable union demands in order to placate a public angered by the
hardships caused by a strike.'" A prohibition on public employee strikes
counteracts these two factors giving public unions unacceptable bargaining
power and limits the ability of a public union to obtain unreasonable conces-
sions from public employers. Under this rationale, the legislature intended to
benefit public employers by prohibiting public employee strikes. Under a strike
prohibition enacted for this reason, public employers should be accorded a
private right of action. Granting public employers a damage action would fur-
ther the policies underlying the statute by helping to rectify the harm which the
statute was intended to avert and by deterring the union from striking in the
future.
A third common rationale for the strike prohibition arises from the
sovereignty concept. According to this rationale, a strike by public employees
constitutes a challenge to governmental authority." This justification for the
strike prohibition would seem to establish no particular class of persons as in-
tended beneficiaries." Arguably, however, the public employers are the in-
tended beneficiaries. It is their specific authority as government representatives
which the public employees challenge by striking. The employers therefore
should have a right of action against the union to vindicate the government's
interest in not having its authority challenged.
In order to determine which rationale prompted a state's prohibition of
public employee strikes, the language and legislative history of the statute first
must be examined. In the absence of clear evidence of legislative intent in these
sources, the legislative scheme governing public employees must be considered
in its entirety in order to discover the reason(s) for the strike prohibition. 50 Like
47 See Harvard Note, supra note 44, at 1315 n.26.
49 See Comment, Strikes by Public Employees: The Consequence of Legislative Inattention, 20
SANTA CLARA L. REv. 945, 947 (1980); Edwards, supra note 44, at 358-61; Norwalk Teachers'
Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 138 Conn. 269, 274-75, 83 A.2d 482, 484-85 (1951).
49 See Harvard Note, supra note 44, at 1315.
'° See Stanford Note, supra note 29, at 1253; Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States,
389 U.S. 191, 203-08 (1967); . Panania Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 439 (1935) (Cardozo, J.,
dissenting) ("The meaning of a statute is to be looked for, not in any single section, but in all the
parts together and in their relation to the end in view.").
Examination of the scheme as a whole may reveal that the legislature had more than one
objective in prohibiting public employee strikes. For example, some state legislatures have
prefaced statutes regulating public employees with a statement that the objective of the statute is
to protect the public by assuring the uninterrupted provision of government services. See, e.g.,
FLA. STAT. ANN. S 447.201 (West 1981); IOWA CODE ANN. 5 20.1 (West 1978); MINN. STAT.
ANN. S 179.61 (Callaghan Supp. 1981); N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW 5 200 (McKinney 1973); TEX.
REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5154c-I, S 2(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. S
41.56.430 (West Supp. 1981). The statutes of some of these same states, however, expressly pro-
vide public employers with damage remedies against striking unions. See FLA. STAT. ANN.
447.507(4) (West 1981) (union liable for damage to employer as result of strike); MINN. STAT.
ANN. S 179.68 subdivs. 1, 3(11) (Callaghan Supp. 1981) (An unlawful strike is an unfair labor
practice for which employer can bring damage suit.). Provision of this remedy to public
employers indicates that a concern for the public employers as well as the public prompted the
strike prohibition. Thus it seems that more than one rationale could underlie a statute prohibiting
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the language and legislative history of the statute prohibiting strikes, however,
the legislative scheme regulating public employees might not indicate clearly
whom the legislature intended to benefit and what purposes it hoped to achieve
by prohibiting public employee strikes. A court therefore would have to resort
to judicial law-making to effectuate what it perceives to be the legislature's pur-
poses in enacting the statute and to ascertain whether the implication of a
damage action will further these purposes.
Although a statute prohibiting strikes may not indicate clearly whom the
legislature intended to benefit, the primary purpose of the prohibition in most
cases will be to prevent public employee strikes. Courts will further this pur-
pose by implying damage actions for the intended beneficiaries of the statute,
whether they are public employers or third parties, since damage awards
should deter the union from striking in the future. Thus, though it may be
unclear from a statute prohibiting strikes that the legislature intended to com-
pensate the intended beneficiaries of the statute for harm caused by a strike, the
implied damage action nonetheless will effectuate the primary purpose of the
strike prohibition by preventing public employee strikes.
2. The Implication of a Private Damage Action for Public Employers
Although a few state statutes permit public employers to sue public
employee unions for damages resulting from illegal strikes, 5 ' most state statutes
do not expressly authorize a damage action in favor of employers. A damage
action for public employers therefore must be implied from the statute pro-
hibiting strikes. Since legislative intent is dispositive of the matter, 52 the court
first must look for evidence of a legislative intent either to grant or deny a
damage remedy. To find this evidence, the court first should examine the
statutory language. The Michigan Supreme Court followed this approach to
public employee strikes. The state legislature could have intended to benefit more than one class
of persons and to achieve more than one goal. See City of Detroit v. Division 26 of the
Amalgamated Ass'n of St. Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees, 332 Mich. 237, 248-49, 51
N.W.2d 228, 233 (1952) (there are many reasons why public employee strikes are prohibited). See
also Caso v. District Council 37, AFSCME, 43 A.D.2d 159, 163, 350 N.Y.S.2d 173, 178 (1973)
where the court recognized that a statute prohibiting strikes can have more than one purpose.
The court noted that "[t]he purpose of the Taylor Law is, inter alia, ' to protect the public ...' "
which indicates that there were other purposes behind the law. One other purpose was to " 'pro-
vide the basis upon which viable government-employee relationships in New York can be
developed.' (Final Report of Governor's Committee on Public Employee Relations (Public
Papers of Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller, 1966, at 877, 883))." Id. at 161-62, 350 N.Y.S.2d at
176.
Thus, a statute prohibiting strikes could provide the basis for implication of a damage
action for both public employers and third parties.
51 See supra note 24.
52 See Stanford Note, supra note 29, at 1253 n.49; Gamm & Eisberg, The Implied Rights
Doctrine, 41 UMKC L. REV, 292, 293 (1972) (legislative intent to preclude remedy is dispositive);
Lamphere Schools v. Lamphere Fed'n of Teachers, 400 Mich. 104, 110, 252 N.W.2d 818, 821
(1977) (in interpreting a statute, legislative intention is controlling).
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ascertain legislative intent in Lamphere Schools v. Lamphere Federation of Teachers."
In Lamphere, which involved an illegal strike by public school teachers, the
court based its denial of a damage remedy to the public employer in part on the
language of the Michigan Public Employment Relations Act (PERA)." The
court reached this result because section 6 of the PERA, dealing with sanctions
against employees who illegally strike, begins with the phrase "notwithstand-
ing the provisions of any other law. "" From this phrase, the court inferred a
legislative intent to provide in section 6 the exclusive sanctions against illegally
striking public employees. 56
Where the statutory language has yielded inconclusive evidence of
legislative intent regarding a damage action, courts have looked to the
legislative history of the statute." This approach may be of no avail, however,
since many state statutes have little, if any, legislative history." Even if a
legislative history exists, it often is silent or ambiguous on the issue of a private
right of action." Thus, a statute's legislative history often is either useless or
susceptible of manipulation on the issue of implied rights of action. The court
can present an interpretation of the history which supports whatever result the
court wants to reach. 6°
Where the statutory language and legislative history are ambiguous,
courts have looked to other aspects of the statutory scheme for evidence of
legislative intent regarding the implication of a cause of action. For example,
33 400 Mich. 104, 252 N.W.2d 818 (1977).
54 MICH. STAT. ANN. 17.454(1)-(32) (Callaghan 1975 & Supp. 1981).
" Lamphere Schools v. Lamphere Fed'n of Teachers, 400 Mich. 104, 112-13, 252
N.W.2d 818, 821-22 (1977).
36 Id. at 113, 252 N.W.2d at 822 (citing Rockwell v. Crestwood School Dist. Bd. of
Educ., 393 Mich. 616, 628, 227 N.W.2d 736, 741 (1975)).
Arguably, however, the court read too much into the phrase. The phrase immediately
precedes the legislative definition of a strike, while the available sanctions are described later in
the paragraph. MICH. STAT. ANN. 17.455(6) (Callaghan 1975). Therefore, the language "not-
withstanding the provisions of any other law" could indicate a legislative intent to provide the ex-
clusive definition of a strike, without necessarily providing the exclusive remedies available to
public employers.
Sr See Siegel, supra note 29, at 1093; Lamphere Schools v. Lamphere Fed'n of Teachers,
400 Mich. 104, 116-17, 252 N.W.2d 818, 823-24 (1977).
39 Hurley v. Allied Chem. Corp., 262 S.E.2d 757, 762 (W. Va. 1980); Stanford Note,
supra note 29, at 1252.
59 Hurley v. Allied Chem. Corp., 262 S.E.2d 757, 763 (W. Va. 1980); accord, McNeal
v. Allen, 95 Wash.2d 265, 277, 621 P.2d 1285, 1291 (1981).
6° See Siegel, supra note 29, at 1093-96 (1979).
For example, in Lamphere, the court emphasized that in amending the Hutchinson Act
to produce the PERA the Michigan legislature had deleted the section of the Hutchinson Act
which provided for criminal penalties against public employee unions. Lamphere Schools v.
Lamphere Fed'n of Teachers, 400 Mich. 104, 116-17, 252 N.W.2d 818, 823-24 (1977). The
court viewed this deletion as indicating "a conscious legislative intent to nullify even the remotest
possibility of such actions, criminal or civil." Id. at 117, 252 N.W.2d at 824. The court easily
could have interpreted the deletion otherwise, however, as indicating a legislative intent merely
to preclude criminal sanctions. The deleted section made no mention of civil penalties. Id.
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some courts have viewed the types of sanctions and remedies expressly provid-
ed by the statute as significant. Where a statute provides no sanctions or inade-
quate sanctions, a court may imply a cause of action in order to render the
statute meaningful. 6 ' Similarly, the availability of express statutory remedies
may connote a legislative intent to provide exclusive measures. 62
 Courts have
reasoned that, had the legislature wished to provide for a private damage ac-
tion, it would have done so in the statute. Nevertheless, some courts have im-
plied such causes of action from statutes that contained a comprehensive
remedial scheme. 63
 One such court regarded a comprehensive list of statutory
measures as non-exclusive because, under other provisions of the statute, the
legislature had designated certain remedies as exclusive. 64
 The court inferred
from this statutory pattern that when the legislature wanted the statutory
remedies to be exclusive, it expressly denominated them as such." On similar
reasoning, other courts have stated that if the legislature expressly authorized
damage actions under other provisions of the statute, it could be inferred that
when the legislature wished to provide a damage remedy, it did so explicitly. 66
Under this reasoning the absence of an express cause of action would indicate a
legislative intent to preclude such actions. Thus, courts have placed varying
importance on the presence of statutory sanctions as an indication of legislative
intent." The extent to which the availability of other statutory sanctions and
remedies weighs against the implication of a private damage action may de-
pend on the types of measures available, their adequacy in effectuating the pur-
poses of the statute, and whether other provisions of the same statute authorize
damage actions."
61 See Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 202 (1967); McNeal v.
Allen, 95 Wash.2d 265, 277, 621 P.2d 1285, 1292 (1981); Gamm & Eisberg, The Implied Rights
Doctrine, 41 UMKC L. REV. 292, 298 (1972) ("Implying a private cause of action for violation of
a statute is often the only means of effectuating the policy expressed by the statute."); Siegel,
supra note 29, at 1097-99; Siegel, supra note 29, at 1254.
62
 National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S.
453, 458 (1974) (where statute provides express remedies, a court should not imply remedies
under the statute absent clear evidence of legislative intent); Lamphere Schools v. Lamphere •
Fed'n of Teachers, 67 Mich. App. 331, 341-42, 240 N.W.2d 792, 798-99 (1976), aff'd, 400 Mich.
104, 252 N.W.2d 818 (1977); Christy v. Petrus, 295 S.W.2d 122, 126 (Mo. 1956) (statute pro-
viding criminal penalties will not be read as implying a civil remedy abgent clear evidence of
legislative intent to that effect).
° 3 See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704-06 (1979); Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 402 n.4 (1971) (refer-
ring to the implication of a cause of action in J.I. Case Co. v. Barak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964));
Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 44 v. City of Dayton, 2 Pub. Bargaining Cas. (CCH) 20,287,
20,950 (Ohio Ct. Corn. Pl. 1976) (court rejected the argument that the comprehensive list of
statutory measures precluded all other remedies).




 See, e.g., Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 572 (1979).
67
 As one court stated, "[v]iolation [of a statute] may carry a penal penalty, may pro-
vide administrative procedures or may be entirely silent on remedy, but yet be held to create a
private civil remedy." McNeal v. Allen, 95 Wash.2d 265, 277, 621 P.2d 1285, 1290 (1981).
66 For a suggested approach to when the presence of statutory sanctions should
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Where the statutory language, the legislative history and the statutory
remedial scheme provide ambiguous evidence of legislative intent regarding an
implied action for damages, the court should look to whether the legislature
enacted the strike prohibition for the special benefit of public employers. 69 A
private damage action should be granted to public employers if the statute was
enacted for their benefit and if implication of a damage action will further the
purposes of the statute. If the legislature prohibited public employee strikes
because the right to strike would give unacceptable bargaining power to the
unions, then the legislature intended to benefit public employers by enacting
the statute. 70 Where the legislature has not declared explicitly the intended
beneficiaries of the strike prohibition, however, the court must examine the en-
tire statutory scheme relating to public employee strikes to determine the pur-
pose of the prohibition:" Such an examination might show that in enacting the
statute, the legislature intended especially to benefit more than one class." For
example, the Lamphere court found that the legislature had prohibited public
employee strikes in order to protect the public." The only statutory sanctions
provided against illegally striking employees, however, were to be exercised by
the public employers. 74 Provision of these sanctions could indicate either that
the legislature intended to benefit the public employers as well as the public, or
that it provided these sanctions to public employers as a means of benefiting the
public. Even in the latter instance, however, it is by benefiting the public
employers that the legislature has benefited the public. Arguably, therefore,
public employers as well as members of the public are the intended
beneficiaries of the strike prohibition.
Where both the public and public employers benefit from a statute pro-
hibiting public employee strikes, it may be difficult to determine whether the
statute was enacted for the "special benefit" of public employers. For that
reason, a court should deem the "special benefit" requirement to be satisfied
as long as a plausible argument can be made, based on the provisions of the
statute, that the legislature intended to benefit public employers." To end the
inquiry and deny an action for damages because of the uncertainty in deter-
mining the intended beneficiaries of the statute could have an unfortunate
result. It could preclude the use of the one sanction against the public union
that would deter it from striking. Thus, where it is uncertain whether the strike
preclude an implied right of action from a state statute, see Stanford Note, supra note 29, at
1253-61.
69 See supra text and notes at notes 41-42.
" See supra text and notes at notes 44-47.
" See supra text and note at note 50.
72 See supra note 50.
73 Lamphere Schools v. Lamphere Fed'n of Teachers, 400 Mich. 104, 128, 252
N.W.2d 818, 829 (1977).
" See MICH. STAT. ANN. 17.455(6) (Callaghan 1975) (providing for employer reme-
dies of discipline and discharge).
75 Indeed, some Supreme Court cases have indicated that a plaintiff need only be an in-
tended beneficiary, rather than a member of the class that Congress wanted especially to benefit.
Siegel, supra note 29, at 1100-01.
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prohibition was enacted for the special benefit of public employers, courts
should focus more on the other requirement for an implied cause of action, i.e.,
that it further the policies behind and enforcement of the statute."
The most obvious case in which implying a damage action in favor of
public employers would not further the policies behind a statute prohibiting
public employee strikes is where the implied action actually would conflict with
the statutory provisions. In such a case, the legislation precludes the implied
remedy." Such conflict can arise in several ways. The most blatant example is
where the implied action would directly interfere with the implementation of
the statutory provisions. In Lamphere, the Michigan Supreme Court believed
that it averted such a conflict by denying a damage action to a public
employer." Under the Michigan Public Employment Relations Act (PERA),
public employees who were dismissed for participating in a strike could be
reinstated if the Michigan Employment Relations Commission (MERC) deter-
mined that the public employer had precipitated the strike by engaging in an
unfair labor practice." The Lamphere court feared that if employers were per-
mitted to bring damage suits against striking unions, the unions probably
would defend by alleging that their employers had committed an unfair labor
practice. 8° To rule on this defense, stated the Lamphere court, would be to in-
fringe on MERC's exclusive authority to determine what actions by employers
constitute unfair labor practices." Allowing courts to entertain damage actions
by public employers might result in conflicting decisions by MERC and the
courts on the issue of unfair labor practices, and would erode MERC's ex-
clusive jurisdiction over this issue." Because of this potential conflict, the court
decided that the public employer could not bring a damage suit against the
union.
In addition to conflicting with other statutory provisions, implying a
damage action for public employers under a statute prohibiting public
employee strikes also could conflict more subtly with the policies behind the
statute." The Lamphere court foresaw this kind of conflict. It stated that "the
76
 It has been suggested that the "especial beneficiary" requirement is a dispensable
element of the implication test, for the relevant consideration should be whether and on what
basis implication is warranted, not who is bringing suit, provided that such suits have no negative
effects on the class that the statute was designed to protect." Id. at 1101-02.
" If it conflicts with the statutory provisions, then the legislature could not have wanted
the action to be available, and legislative intent governs the issue. See, e.g., Middlesex County
Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 101 S. Ct. 2615, 2622 (1981); Cort v. Ash,
422 U.S. 66, 78(1975); Comtronics, Inc. v. Puerto Rico Tel. Co., 553 F.2d 701, 705-07 (1st Cir.
1977); Phoenix Ref. Co. v. Powell, 251 S.W.2d 892, 896 (Tex, Civ. App. 1952) (courts seek to
carry out the underlying statutory policies they believe the legislature must have had in mind)
"The courts have been careful not to exceed the purpose which they attribute to the legislature."
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS S 36 at 192 (4th ed. 1971).
78
 400 Mich. 104, 119, 252 N.W.2d 818, 825 (1977).
79 Id. at 117-18, 252 N.W.2d at 824.
t'° Id. at 119, 252 N.W.2d at 825.
" Id.
82 Id
" See, e.g., Mezullo v. Maletz, 331 Mass. 233, 118 N.E.2d 356 (1954). In Mezullo, the
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ultimate legislative goal [of the statute regulating public school employees] is to
achieve a prompt, fair resolution of disputes while avoiding the disruption of
the educational process."" The court feared that if a damage action were im-
plied under the statute, strike settlements would be delayed while the courts
resolved multiple claims and counterclaims." These multiple claims, stated the
court, would result in a "labor law logjam" in the courts, and also would ag-
gravate labor-management disputes." These potential results of public
employer damage suits, concluded the court, militated strongly against grant-
ing a damage action to public employers.
The Lamphere court's decision to deny the public employer a damage ac-
tion against the union may well be correct insofar as it is based on statutory in-
terpretation and the possibility of conflicts between the rulings of MERC and
the courts. The court's view that an employer damage action would conflict
with the policies behind the public employee legislation, however, is less per-
suasive. First, the fear of a "labor-law logjam" seems unfounded, since there
has been a dearth of employer damage suits even in states which expressly per-
mit public employers to sue public unions for damages from illegal strikes."
Furthermore, the argument that employer damage actions will exacerbate
labor-management disputes, while it has found some support," is also flawed.
Public employers should have the option of taking measures that may adversely
affect labor-management relations. An employer understands the relationship
it has with its employee's union and can best weigh the considerations involved
in commencing a damage suit. In some cases the benefits an employer derives
from a damage suit may outweigh the possible adverse effects. For example, in
some circumstances an employer might feel that bringing suit would provide
the showing of strength it needs in order to deal more effectively with the
union. 89 Furthermore, other remedies expressly provided by statute also might
aggravate a labor-management dispute. The Michigan PERA, for example,
provides for the discharge of striking employees. 90 If exercised, this remedy
plaintiff sought to have a civil action implied under a penal statute forbidding wrongful commit-
ment to mental institutions. The court refused to imply an action since implication would conflict
with the legislative goal of immunizing doctors from civil liability when commitment was court-
ordered. Id. at 239-40, 118 N.E.2d at 360. See also Teale v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 66 III. 2d 1,
359 N.E.2d 473 (1977): "The carefully limited civil remedies authorized by these statutes
demonstrate, in our opinion, that it would be incongruous to derive by implication a right to
recover unlimited damages for a violation of this statute." Id. at 6, 359 N.E.2d at 475; Stanford
Note, supra note 29, at 1260-61 (in implying causes of action, courts must be careful not to thwart
legislative purposes).
84 400 Mich. 104, 130, 252 N.W.2d 818, 830 (1977).
85 Id. at 131, 252 N.W.2d at 830.
86 Id.
87 No cases involving employer damage suits have been found in the eight states that
statutorily authorize an employer damage remedy. See supra note 24.
as See supra text and notes at notes 17 and 22.
89 See Note, Parent Union Liability for Strikes in Breach of Contract, 67 CAL. L. REV. 1028,
1033 (1979) (discussing the analogous situation of why a private sector employer might want to
bring a damage suit against the union).
9° MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.455(6) (Callaghan 1975).
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also could intensify worker discontent and prolong a strike. It is suggested that
the availability of a private action for employers would be no more damaging to
employment relations than existing remedies.
Moreover, even if allowing employers to sue public employee unions
would exacerbate labor-management disputes in particular cases, implying
such a damage action still would effectuate the primary goal of the statutory
strike prohibition by preventing future strikes. 9 ' In some cases, however, a
strike prohibition may be only part of an elaborate statutory scheme which
prescribes a certain balance of power between public employers and public
employees. Under such statutes, the strike prohibition may not be categorical,
and implying an employer damage action would upset the legislatively
established balance of power between public employers and employees. 92 A
damage action could give public employers a weapon that the legislature never
intended the employer to have and may subject the unions to more liability
than the legislature intended." A court must determine, therefore, whether the
state legislature intended to give priority to the prohibition of strikes or to the
maintenance of a certain balance in labor-management relations.
To conclude that in regulating public employees the legislature was more
concerned with striking a balance in employer-employee relations than with
preventing strikes, however, "implies that the legislature intended that .
public employee strikes [would] play a role in the bargaining relationship." 94
Generally, however, the prohibition of public employee strikes is an uncondi-
tional part of the legislatively established balance of power." Where a state's
legislation indicates such an absolute and unconditional prohibition, a court
should try to enforce that prohibition. An implied damage action for the public
employer would serve that goal. Only where legislation provides that statutory
sanctions against a striking union are conditional upon other factors could this
balance of power between public employers and employees take precedence
over the prohibition of strikes."
91 See supra text and notes at notes 19-20.
92 Public employer damage suits, "far from promoting a balance of bargaining between
the parties, would probably only aggravate any existing imbalance." Comment, Collective
Bargaining for Public Employees and the Prevention of Strikes in the Public Sector, 68 MICH. L. REV. 260,
293 (1969); see also Lamphere Schools v. Lamphere Fed'n of Teachers, 400 Mich. 104, 131, 252
N.W.2d 818, 830 (1977).
93 Lamphere Schools v. Lamphere Fed'n of Teachers, 400 Mich. 104, 131, 252
N.W.2d 818, 830 (1977).
9* Harvard Note, supra note 44, at 1320.
" See Arouca, supra note 20, at 816-17, dealing with the illegality of railway strikes, and
the possibility of employer damage suits. Arouca points out that the giving or withholding of the
right to strike is part of the balance of power intended by the legislature between labor and
management; the implication is that, in doing all they can to prevent illegal strikes, the courts are
furthering the legislatively designed balance of power between labor and management, even if
this balance results in hostility between the parties. Id.
96 For example, under the Michigan legislation, public teachers who strike because of
the employer's unfair labor practice may escape the statutory sanction of dismissal. Lamphere
Schools v. Lamphere Fed'n of Teachers, 400 Mich. 104, 117-18, 252 N.W.2d 818, 824 (1977).




In deciding whether to imply a public employer damage action from the
statute, a court must carefully examine the legislative scheme dealing with
public employees. Absent clear evidence of legislative intent to provide or deny
the action, a court should be decidedly receptive to implication where the
legislation was intended to benefit public employers and where the remedies
expressly provided by the statute are inadequate to protect public employers
and prevent public employee strikes. The widespread occurrence of public
employee strikes demonstrates the general inadequacy of the express statutory
remedies. Thus, since a damage action will help rectify the harm illegally in-
flicted on the employers and deter the unions from violating the strike prohibi-
tion, such actions for employers usually will be warranted. An exception to the
general desirability of a public employer damage action is where the legislative
scheme carefully balances the rights of public employers and employees and
punishment for illegal strikes is conditional or discretionary. In such instances,
a court must determine whether the legislative balance of power should take
precedence over the strike prohibition.
3. The Implication of a Third Party Damage Action
In deciding whether to imply a damage action for a third party harmed by
an illegal strike, a court should employ the same analysis as when a public
employer requests an implied action. The first step in this analysis is to deter-
mine whether the state legislature, in prohibiting public employee strikes, in-
tended to grant third parties a damage action for violations of this prohibition.
In Jamur Productions Corp. v. Quill" the New York Supreme Court held that it
would not imply an action without some evidence of legislative intent to do
so." Jamur involved a damage suit by third parties who had suffered losses
because of an illegal strike by public transit workers. The court refused to im-
ply a damage action because the legislature had provided neither expressly nor
implicitly for such an action. According to the court, "[t]tle failure to act must
be regarded as an expression of public policy. "99
Other courts have taken a less restrictive approach to implied actions.
Where the statutory language and legislative history have yielded no evidence
of legislative intent, these courts have looked to the two general criteria for the
implication of remedies.'" To satisfy the first criterion, a third party must be a
member of the class for whose "especial benefit" the strike prohibition was
enacted."' For example, in those states which preface their legislation
the rights of the parties. . ." and "is but only one element that need be considered in determin-
ing the respective rights and duties of the public employer and the public employees." Lamphere
Schools v. Lamphere Fed'n of Teachers, 67 Mich, App. 331, 336, 240 N.W.2d 792, 796 (1976),
aff'd, 400 Mich. 104, 252 N.W.2d 818 (1977).
97 51 Misc.2d 501, 273 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1966).
" Id. at 506, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 352-53.
99 Id, at 506, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 353.
I" See supra text and notes at notes 41-42.
101 See supra text and note at note 41.
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regulating public employees with references to the public good,'" a third party
should be able to establish that the strike prohibition was enacted for the
benefit of members of the public. Even where the public employee legislation
does not explicitly state that it is enacted for the public good, it is arguable that
by enacting a statute prohibiting strikes, the legislature intended to protect the
public. It is the public which often suffers the greatest harm from public
employee strikes."' Thus, it is logical to assume that injury to the public is the
harm which the legislature intended to avert by prohibiting strikes. Even if the
legislature prohibited strikes for the benefit of the public, however, many
courts will imply an action only from statutes which benefit a particular group
or class of people and not from statutes enacted for the benefit of the general
public. 104
 The New York Supreme Court adopted this restrictive reading of the
"especial benefit" requirement in Jamur. In refusing to imply a third party
damage action, the Jamur court stated that "{w]hen the statute merely defines,
in the interest of the general public, the degree of care which shall be exercised
under specified circumstances, it does not 'create' a new liability.'""
Some courts have rejected this particular class/general public distinction
and have implied actions from statutes enacted for the benefit of the general
public.'" This approach seems logical, because members of the general public
are only potentially within the class of beneficiaries; only those who actually
suffer the harm which the statute is intended to prevent can state a cause of ac-
tion based on the statute.'" Nonetheless, many courts do make the particular
class/general public distinction. Thus, a third party's success in obtaining an
implied damage action will depend on whether the particular court makes such
a distinction.
The second citerion for the implication of a third party damage action is
that the implied action must further the policies behind and the enforcement of
102 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. 5 447.201 (West 1981); IOWA CODE ANN. S 20.1 (West
1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. S 179.61 (Callaghan Supp. 1981); N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW 5 200
(McKinney 1973); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5154c-I, S 2(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1981);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 5 41.56.430 (West Supp. 1981).
'" See supra text and note at note 43.
'°4
 Odell v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 201 F.2d 123, 127 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S.
941 (1953); Southern Mining Co. v. Saylor, 264 Ky. 655, 664-65, 95 S.W.2d 236, 241 (1936);
Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Co., 270 N.Y. 287, 305, 200 N.E. 824, 829 (1936);
Jamur Prods. Corp. v. Quill, 51 Misc.2d 501, 505-06, 273 N.Y.S.2d 348, 352-53 (1966).
106
 51 Misc.2d 501, 506, 273 N.Y.S.2d 348, 353 (1966) (citing Schmidt v. Merchants
Despatch Transp. Co., 270 N.Y. 287, 305, 200 N.E.2d 824, 829 (1936)).
' 06
 Meshbesher v. Channellene Oil & Mfg. Co., 107 Minn. 104, 108, 119 N.W. 428,
429 (1909); Abounader v. Strohmeyer & Arpe Co., 243 N.Y. 458, 464, 154 N.E. 309, 311
(1926). See also Costello v. City of Wheeling, 145 W. Va. 455, 458-59, 117 S.E.2d 513, 515-16
(1960) (permitting private cause of action for violations of statute requiring sidewalks to be in
good repair); Caso v. Gotbaum, 67 Misc.2d 205, 210, 323 N.Y.S.2d 742, 748-49 (1971) (ques-
tioning the particular class/general public distinction: "Can one distinguish penal statutes of
'particular benefit' from those for the benefit of the public at large? Should such a concept exist?
Is the whole approach anything different than seeking to find in the books an existing base for a
legal duty, even in a penal statute?").
107 Harvard Note, supra note 44, at 1317.
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the statute. Obviously, this criterion is not met if the damage action would con-
flict in some way with other statutory provisions. In Burke & Thomas, Inc. v. In-
ternational Organization of Masters, Mates & Pilots 108 the Washington Supreme
Court found such a conflict. Burke involved a damage suit brought by third par-
ties who had suffered losses as a result of an illegal strike by public ferry
workers.' 99 Although the third parties sued under a novel tort theory rather
than under the statute,"° the court's reasoning in denying the third parties' re-
quest for relief would apply as well to a request for the implcation of a damage
action. The court claimed that third party damage suits would interfere with
the authority of the State Public Employment Relations Commission to resolve
labor disputes."' The court asserted that union liability to third parties could
nullify the effect of the Commission's resolution of disputes by imposing on the
unions large penalties which the Commission had not intended. 12 Thus, the
court refused to establish a new tort action because of that conflict.
In addition to the possibility of a direct conflict between a third party
damage action and the Commission's authority to resolve disputes, the court
contended that a third party damage action would hinder the effectuation of the
policies behind the public employee relations legislation. Like the Lamphere
court,'" the Burke court perceived the strike prohibition in the Washington
statute as only one aspect of a legislative scheme that was intended to ac-
comodate the rights of both public employers and employees.'" To the Burke
court, the creation of implied actions in favor of third parties injured by public
employee strikes would upset this legislatively established balance of power."s
While acknowledging that both the Washington statute and the common law
prohibited public employee strikes," 6 the court held that the overall goal of the
state's public labor legislation was to achieve and maintain labor peace by
carefully balancing labor-management relations."' The court therefore main-
tained that the comprehensive legislation in the area warranted judicial
restraint."s The court pointed out that a third party damage action would
disrupt the legislative balance" 9 and complicate the bargaining process,'"
since the unions would insist on contractual provisions whereby the public
employers would indemnify them against third party damage awards."'
'°° 92 Wash.2d 762, 600 P.2d 1282 (1979).
109 Id. at 763-64, 600 P.2d at 1283-84.
"° Id. at 770, 600 P.2d at 1287.
Id. at 774-75, 600 P.2d at 1289.
" 2 Id.
See supra text and notes at notes 84-86, 96, 101.
'" Burke & Thomas, Inc. v. International Org. of Masters, 92 Wash.2d 762, 770-72,
600 P.2d 1282, 1287-88 (1979).
"5 Id. at 772-73, 600 P.2d at 1288.
16 Id. at 770, 600 P.2d at 1287.
107  Id. at 771, 600 P.2d at 1287.
" 8 Id. at 772-74, 600 P.2d at 1287-88.
19 Id. at 772-73, 600 P.2d at 1288.
120 Id. at 775, 600 P.2d at 1289-90.
121 Id. at 775, 600 P.2d at 1290. The court cited Lamphere Schools v. Lamphere Fed'n
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The Burke court's contention that a third party damage action would upset
the legislatively established balance in public employer-employee relations has
some merit. When a state's labor legislation represents a careful balancing of
the interests of labor and management, the courts should hesitate to imply ac-
tions based on the statute's prohibition of strikes.' 22
 Even where such careful
balancing is present, however, as long as the strike prohibition is unconditional
other countervailing considerations may favor the implication of a third party
damage action. 123
 First, even if the sanctions available to public employers
generally provide adequate deterrence against illegal strikes, these sanctions
often cannot prevent great damage from being inflicted on the public if the
union chooses to strike despite the sanctions. If the legislature prohibited public
employee strikes in order to protect the public, then the members of the public
should have a remedy for harm inflicted on them through a union's illegal ac-
tions. Moreover, a damage action would further the policies behind the strike
prohibition by compensating third parties for harm that the statute was intend-
ed to avert and by deterring public unions from striking. 124
Indeed, an implied third party damage action is a more effective deterrent
against illegal public employee strikes than is an employer damage action. For
various reasons, a public employer may be reluctant to pursue any remedy
against the union, including a damage action.' 28 The employer may wish to
end the strike quickly and forego all sanctions.'" In that case, a third party
damage suit, a sanction the employer is powerless to waive, might be the only
way to penalize the union and deter it from striking again.'" Admittedly,
although a third party damage suit might prevent some strikes, it might pro-
long the strikes that do occur.' 28
 A union might be reluctant to settle the strike
unless the public employer agreed to indemnify the union against potential
third party suits. 128
 Where the potential liability of the union was substantial,
of Teachers, 400 Mich. 104, 131, 252 N.W.2d 818, 830 (1977) as authority for the proposition
that alternative tort remedies would delay the resolution of strikes. Id.
122 See Stanford Note, supra note 29, at 1253.
123
 As one commentator stated," [i]f, for example, the guarantee of the right to collective
bargaining is part of a larger scheme controlling labor-management relations, allowing a private
action may interfere with the broader goals of the system. On the other hand, a private action
may be essential to achieving the broader purpose." Id. at 1259. Arguably, the broad purpose of
a state's public employee legislation is to establish a balance of power between public employer
and employees in which the right to strike plays no part. A third party damage action may pro-
vide the deterrent effect needed to achieve this goal.
"4
 See Caso v. District Council 37, AFSCME, 43 A.D.2d 159, 162, 350 N.Y.S.2d 173,
176 (1973) where the court noted that the purposes of the state's public employee legislation and
strike prohibition, "as well as the general welfare of the public, are best served by permitting ap-
propriate redress for violation of the law." Id. The court, therefore, permitted third parties to
bring a tort action against an illegally striking public employee union.
125 See supra text and notes at notes 14, 17.
126 See supra text and note at note 17.
1"r
	 supra text and note at note 18.
126 See Lamphere Schools v. Lamphere Fed'n of Teachers, 400 Mich. 104, 131, 252
N.W.2d 818, 830 (1977); Burke & Thomas, Inc. v. International Org. of Masters, 92 Wash.2d
762, 600 P.2d 1282, 1290 (1979); Harvard Note, supra note 44, at 1320.
t" See Burke & Thomas, Inc. v. International Org. of Masters, 92 Wash.2d 762, 775,
600 P.2d 1282, 1290 (1979); see also Harvard Note, supra note 44, at 1320.
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the public employer would be equally reluctant to indemnify the union."° Yet
a strike settlement also could be delayed while the parties bargained over the
employer's use of express statutory remedies. Furthermore, the public
employer's reluctance to indemnify the union could help to deter the union
from striking, since even if the employer agreed to indemnify, this agreement
probably would be at the price of reducing other concessions made to the
union.' 3 ' Thus, the prospect of a strike would be less attractive to the union
than if there were no third party damage suits and consequently no indem-
nification agreements.'"
In summary, the two requirements for implication of a third party damage
action from a statute prohibiting public employee strikes are that the strike pro-
hibition has been enacted for the special benefit of the public and that the im-
plied remedy will further the policies behind the statute. The first requirement
poses the greatest difficulty for third parties, since many courts will not imply
an action from statutes enacted for the benefit of the general public. Regarding
the second requirement for implication, however, strong arguments can be
made as to the importance, and even the need, of a third party damage action.
As long as the statute unconditionally prohibits public employee strikes, a third
party damage action will effectuate the purposes of the statute by compensating
members of the public for harm inflicted on them and by preventing future
violations of the statutes.
This note suggests one caveat to the preceding conclusions concerning im-
plied damage actions for employers and third parties. Although implying a
damage action may further the purposes of statutes prohibiting public
employee strikes, the legislative scheme dealing with public employee labor
relations may be of such a nature as to indicate that the legislature has
preempted the area. In that case, the legislation would preclude not just the im-
plication of damage actions, but also the use of any tort or contract remedies
otherwise available to public employers and third parties. ' 33
B. Preemption of Remedies Not Expressly Provided By Statute
The preemption doctrine is a federal doctrine which generally holds that
certain matters are of such national concern as to demand national uniformity
of regulation.' 34 Thus, federal laws on such matters preempt, or take
precedence over, state laws concerning that matter. In some cases the state
laws on the matter are only preempted to the extent that they actually conflict
with the federal legislation.'" In other cases, however, federal occupation of
' 3° Harvard Note, supra note 44, at 1319 (A public employer "would be less likely to
`waive' privately recoverable damages by means of an indemnification agreement, since such in-
demnification would impose positive costs on the governmental unit.").
'" Id. at 1319 n.50,
"2 Id.
"3 See infra text and notes at note 134-66.
'4 See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 267-70 (1978); Hirsch, Toward a New View of Federal Preemption, 1972 U. ILL. L.F.
515.
'" NOWAK, supra note 134, at 267.
1108	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 [Vol. 23:1087
the field may be so complete as to preclude even non-conflicting state laws on
the issue. 136
 In the context of both public employer and third party damages
suits, some public employee unions have used reasoning analogous to federal
preemption concepts to argue that a state's public employee labor legislation
occupies the field and provides the exclusive measures available against public
employee unions which illegally strike.'"
1. Preemption Arguments and Public Employer Suits
In holding that a public employer could not bring a damage suit against
an illegally striking public union, the Lamphere court explicitly relied on an
analogy to federal preemption of the field of private sector labor relations.'"
The Michigan Supreme Court noted that the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) has exclusive jurisdiction in ruling on unfair labor practice charges in
the private sector, which precludes courts from hearing tort claims based on the
same alleged unfair labor practice.'" By analogy, the court reasoned that the
Michigan Employment Relations Commission's (MERC) authority to hear
unfair labor practices charges arising from public employee strikes precluded
Michigan courts from entertaining damage suits based on such strikes.'" The
potential conflict in rulings by MERC and the courts on the same unfair labor
practice charge was one basis for a finding of preemption."' The court held,
however, that even absent such conflict, the state labor legislation precluded
public employer damage suits because the legislature intended to provide the
exclusive remedies for illegal public employee strikes.'" The court found such
a purpose behind the legislation."'
If there is no state entity analogous to the NLRB, a public employee union
nonetheless could argue that the very comprehensiveness of a state's statutory
scheme indicates a legislative intent to preempt the field and provide the ex-
clusive remedies for public employers in the event of an illegal strike.'" One
court has rejected such an argument, holding that it would liberally construe
the state public employee labor legislation and permit any employer cause of
l36 Id.
1 " See infra text and notes at notes 138-46.
138
 400 Mich. 104, 119-24, 252 N.W.2d 818, 825-26 (1977).
199 See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 246 (1959). For ex-
ceptions to this exclusive jurisdiction, see PROSSER, supra note 77, S 130 at 968-69.
"° Lamphere Schools v. Lamphere Fed'n of Teachers, 400 Mich. 104, 118-19, 252
N.W.2d 818, 824-25 (1977).
" 1 Id. at 119, 252 N.W.2d at 825.
"2 Id. at 124, 252 N.W.2d at 827.
1 " Id. at 113-14, 252 N.W.2d at 822. An exception to the NLRB's preemptive authority
arises where union violence occurs. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236,
247-48 (1959). In San Diego the Court held that the compelling state interest of maintaining peace
permits state courts to hear tort claims based on the violence. Id. at 247. Since Lamphere involved
a peaceful strike, the court found it unnecessary to decide whether such an exception to MERC 's
authority existed. 400 Mich. 104, 123 n.6, 252 N.W.2d 818, 826 n.6 (1977).
144 Jackson, supra note 19, at 86.
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action which did not directly conflict with the legislation."' Thus, where the
state statute has created no entity analogous to the NLRB, it appears that
courts will not embrace as willingly an analogy to federal preemption of private
sector labor relations.'"
Another issue raised by the preemption doctrine is its applicability to
breach of contract remedies. The analogy to federal preemption of private sec-
tor labor relations provides support for a finding that contract remedies are not
preempted by state legislation. Section 301 of the Labor-Management Rela-
tions Act (LMRA) 147 permits federal court damage actions for breaches of
labor contracts even if the breach also constitutes an unfair labor practice over
which the NLRB ordinarily has sole jurisdiction.'" The inference can be
drawn from the enactment of section 301 that the need for preemption of the
area of labor relations does not outweigh the necessity of permitting parties to
vindicate their contractual rights. The Lamphere court drew a different in-
ference from section 301, however, and stated that even contract remedies were
precluded by the legislation.'" The court reasoned that the legislature could
have enacted a provision analogous to section 301 had it wished to provide con-
tract remedies to public employers.' 50 The absence of a statutory provision
analogous to section 301 of the LMRA however, does not necessarily indicate
that the legislature wished to preclude actions for breach of contract. It was
necessary for Congress to enact section 301 because the clearly preemptive
nature of federal labor legislation otherwise would have precluded any judicial
interference with the NLRB's authority to implement uniform national labor
policies."' Thus, unless a state legislature has clearly indicated that the legisla-
tion precludes all other remedies, a court should permit breach of contract suits
by public employers as long as such suits do not conflict with statutory provi-
sions. ' 52
145 Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 44 v. City of Dayton, 2 Pub. Bargaining Cas.
(CCH) T 20,287 at 20,950 (Ohio Ct. Corn. Pl. 1976).
146 See also Caso v. District Council 37, AFSCME, 43 A.D.2d 159, 161-62, 350
N.Y.S.2d 173, 176 (1973) (court rejected argument that state's comprehensive public employee
legislation precluded all other remedies).
147 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976).
146 Id.
"9 400 Mich. 104, 123, 252 N.W.2d 818, 827 (1977).
"° Id. It seems inconsistent with a preemption argument, however, for the court to state
that all remedies not provided by statute are precluded except for the remedy of injunction, since
the courts "recognize[d] that this remedy presents the best possible means for assuring the
uninterrupted delivery of vital educational services to the public." Id. at 128, 252 N.W.2d at 829.
If the legislature truly intended to preempt the area, the court would not be free to decide on ad-
ditional remedies. See supra text and note at note 134.
' 51 See supra text and note at note 139.
1 " See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 620 n.4 (1978); Goldstein v.
California, 412 U.S. 546, 554-55 (1973). See also NOwAK, supra note 134, at 270 (Supreme Court
recently has refused to find preemption unless either Congress has explicitly stated its intention to
preempt or there is a distinct possibility of conflict). The legislature might have considered it un-
necessary to provide expressly for a remedy as basic as a contract remedy. For a discussion of the
importance of a contract remedy, see infra text and notes at notes 320-27; see also Jackson, supra
note 19, at 87.
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In general, courts should require clear evidence of a legislative intent to
preempt the area of public employee labor relations before it concludes that all
remedies for illegal strikes not provided in the statute are precluded. Lacking
such clear evidence, and absent any conflict between the proposed damage ac-
tion and the statutory provisions, the court should permit public employers to
bring damage suits against public unions on available tort and contract
theories.
2. Preemption Arguments and Third Party Suits
A possible bar to third party damage suits, as well as to public employer
damage suits, is a legislative intent to preempt the area and provide the ex-
clusive remedies against illegally striking public employee unions. Had the
plaintiff in Lamphere been a third party, rather than the public employer, the
court's language indicates that the results would have been the same. The
court held that only those remedies expressly provided in the statute could be
invoked against an illegally striking employee union.'" The Michigan statute
contained no third party remedies.' 54
Other courts have been less receptive to the argument that a state's labor
legislation preempts the area and precludes all other remedies. In Caso v.
District Council 37, AFSCME,'" for example, the New York Supreme Court re-
jected the contention of the public employee union that New York's Taylor
Law, dealing with public employee relations, provided the exclusive remedies
against public unions which violated the Taylor Law.' 56 Caso was a damage
suit brought by municipalities whose beaches were polluted when public
employees at a sewage treatment plant illegally went on strike.'" Although the
Taylor Lawl" comprehensively regulated the public employer-employee rela-
tionship in New York, the court held that the law did not govern public
employee relations with third parties, such as the plaintiff.'" Rather than view
the comprehensiveness of the Taylor Law as indicative of a legislative intent to
preempt the regulation of public employee relations, the court chose to con-
strue the statute liberally to effectuate its purpose.' 6° The court viewed as ex-
clusive only those remedies which the legislature expressly designated as
such."' The court claimed that if the statutory remedies were regarded as ex-
clusive, "the Taylor Law would become an impenetrable shield of immunity
for public employees who may illegally cause serious damage to persons or par-
ties other than their employer. "162 The municipalities therefore were permitted
155 400 Mich. 104, 123-24, 252 N.W.2d 818, 827 (1977).
154 Ste MICH. STAT. ANN. S 17.455(6) (Callaghan 1975).
L 43 A.D.2d 159, 350 N.Y.S.2d 173 (1973).
156 Id. at 161-62, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 176-77.
"' Id. at 160-61, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 175.
"I N.Y. Crv. SERV. LAW SS 200-14 (McKinney 1973 & Supp. 1981).
19 43 A.D.2d at 162, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 176.
' 6° Id. at 163, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 178.
III Id. at 162, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 177.
162 Id.
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to bring a common law action in nuisance against the union, 163 although the
Taylor Law did not expressly provide for this remedy.
In Burke & Thomas, Inc. v. International Organization of Masters, the
Washington Supreme Court implicitly took the same approach towards
Washington's labor legislation. Despite the comprehensivenss of the legislative
scheme regulating public employees, the court indicated that third parties
could bring applicable tort or contract actions against a union striking in viola-
tion of the statutory prohibition.'" The court advocated judicial restraint,
however, in creating new tort remedies for third parties against illegally striking
public employee unions."' Thus, the court implicitly acknowledged that,
however comprehensive the state public employee relations legislation, it did
not preempt traditional tort and contract remedies for third parties.
For reasons even more compelling than those presented in the context of
of public employer suits, courts should not assume that in enacting public
employee legislation the legislature intended to preempt the area of public
employee relations and provide the exclusive remedies available in the event of
an illegal public employee strike. For the most part, the express remedies pro-
vided by the applicable state statute will be for the public employer's use
only. 166 Consequently, while a finding of preemption would merely limit public
employers to the statutory remedies, it probably would totally deprive third
. parties of a remedy. The preemption of the entire area of public employee rela-
tions, such that public employers and third parties are precluded from bringing
tort and contract actions against public unions, could deprive public employers
and third parties of any redress for harm illegally inflicted on them by public
unions. Therefore, a court should require clear evidence that the legislature in-
tended such a result.
3. No Implication or Preemption of Remedies
Upon examining a state's legislative scheme concerning public employees,
a court may determine that, while the statute prohibiting strikes does not afford
a basis for the implication of a damage action, neither does the statutory
scheme call for a finding of preemption. The Burke decision exemplifies this ap-
proach to a state statutory scheme. In Burke, the Washington Supreme Court
refused to create a new tort action,'" but indicated that traditional tort and
contract remedies still were available against public employee unions which il-
legally strike. 168 If a court adopts this approach, a public employer or third par-
ty may state a cause of action against an illegally striking union under an ex-
isting tort or contract theory.
' 63 Id. at 163, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 178.
1" The third parties in Burke could not recover only because they did not allege facts suf-
ficient to state a cause of action in tort or contract. 92 Wash.2d 762, 767-68, 600 P.2d 1282,
1285-86 (1979).
163 Id. at 770, 600 P.2d at 1287-88.
'" See supra text and notes at notes 8-12.
167 92 Wash.2d 762, 776-77, 600 P.2d 1282, 1290 (1979).
166 See supra text and note at note 164.
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II. TORT ACTIONS FOR PUBLIC EMPLOYERS AND THIRD PARTIES
Where a state statutory scheme does not preempt the area of public
employee relations,'" public employers and third parties can sue illegally strik-
ing public employee unions under several theories of tort liability. The first
such tort theory is tortious interference with business relations. This general
tort action encompasses three slightly different torts:'" tortious inducement of
breach of contract, tortious interference with contract, and tortious in-
terference with prospective advantage. Tortious inducement of breach of con-
tract involves situations where one party intentionally, and without privilege,
persuades another to breach a contractual duty owed to a third party.'" Tor-
tious interference with contract occurs where a party, while not inducing a
breach of contract, without privilege prevents the performance of a contract or
makes performance more difficult.'" The tort of interference with prospective
advantage extends the principle behind the two preceding torts by imposing
liability for unprivileged interference with advantageous economic relations
which are merely prospective or potential, and not yet sealed by a contract. 13
The difference between this and the two preceding torts is that more extensive
privileges are recognized in connection with interference with advantageous
economic relations. 14
A second tort theory of recovery against an illegally striking union is tort
per se, which imposes direct liability in damages for the breach of a legal duty
which results in harm to another.'" Finally, a cause of action in nuisance may
be available. Nuisance encompasses the two distinct torts of public and private
nuisance. A public nuisance is any unreasonable interference with the exercise
of rights common to all members of the public.'" A private nuisance is an in-
terference with a person's use and enjoyment of his land.'" The usefulness of
these tort theories will depend on the status of the plaintiff. Some of the
theories, for example, will be useful primarily, or only, to either public
employers or third parties. The analysis of each tort theory, therefore, will in-
clude a discussion of any such limitations on its availability.
169 See supra text and notes at notes 134-66.
10 For a general discussion of the interrelation among these three torts, see PROSSER,
supra note 77, 5 129 at 927-49. Prosser does not refer to these three torts under the general name
of interference with business relations. Some courts, however, have referred generally to the torts
of interference with contractual relations and prospective advantage as interference with business
relations. See, e.g., Burke & Thomas, Inc. v. International Org. of Masters, 92 Wash.2d 762,
768, 600 P.2d 1282, 1286 (1979); Island Air, Inc. v. LaBar, 18 Wash. App. 129, 139, 566 P.2d
972, 978 (1977).
' 7 ' 4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 766 (1977).
12 Id. S 766 comment h.
122 Id. 5 766B.
174 See PROssER, supra note 77, 5 130 at 953-69.
'" Pasadena Unified School Dist. v. Pasadena Fed'n of Teachers, Local 1050, 72 Cal.
App.3d 100, 111-13, 140 Cal. Rptr. 41, 48-9 (1977).
176 4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 821B (1977).
' 77 Id. at 5 821D.
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A. Tortious Interference With Business Relations
By calling a strike, a public employee union induces its member
employees to breach their contractual obligation not to strike. Since public
employees owe this contractual duty to the employer and not to third parties,
only the public employer can sue the union for tortiously inducing a breach of
contract. A tortious interference with contract, however, requires merely that
the defendant make it impossible, or very difficult, for another party to perform
a contractual duty.'" Since public employee strikes may make it difficult or im-
possible for members of the public to meet their contractual obligations, 19 such
third parties may be able to avail themselves of this tort remedy.'" Public
employers generally cannot sue public unions on this tort theory, however.
Government entities generally have no contractual duty to provide the public
with the services ordinarily rendered by the striking public employees. Thus, a
strike does not prevent a public employer from fulfilling a contractual obliga-
tion to the public. Both public employers and third parties may be able to sue a
union for tortious interference with prospective advantage, which is the un-
privileged, intentional interference with potential advantageous economic rela-
tions not yet sealed by contract. Thus, third parties may sue under this tort
theory where a strike has prevented them from entering into a business or con-
tractual relationship, such as where a transit strike results in a loss of
customers.' 8 ' This tort theory also may be useful to public employers in cases
where the striking public employees are not under contract, or where the strike
occurs after the employment contracts of the striking employees have expired.
In such cases, the calling of a strike interferes with an employment relationship
which, while not contractual in nature, nonetheless is economically advan-
tageous to the public employer.
Both public employers and third parties who sue a public union for tor-
tious interference with business relations may have more difficulty overcoming
a preemption argument than if they had brought suit on some other tort
theory. This added difficulty arises from the observation in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts that "[o]bviously, the law of labor disputes and their effect in
interfering with contractual relations has ceased to be regarded as a part of tort
law and has become an integral part of the general subject of Labor Law, with
all of its statutory and administrative regulations.. • .' 192 This statement in-
dicates that, in general, labor legislation precludes tort actions against a union
"A PROSSER, supra note 77, 5 129 at 935.
'" Transit strikes in particular may prevent third parties from fulfilling contractual
obligations.
180 See infra text and notes at notes 216-48.
IRI See Burns, Jackson, Miller, Summit & Spitzer v. Lindner, 1980-81 Pub. Bargaining
Cas. (CCH) 37,253 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. March 31, 1981) (motion to dismiss denied).
182 4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 2 (1977). The reporters therefore deleted from
the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) chapter 38 of the first RESTATEMENT which dealt with interference
with contractual relations caused by labor disputes. Id.
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based on interference with contractual relations. It seems logical to assume,
however, that in referring to "Labor Law," the Restatement reporters had in
mind federal private sector labor legislation rather than public sector legisla-
tion. While federal labor legislation generally precludes courts from hearing
tort actions against private sector labor unions,'" legislation concerning public
sector unions presents a different situation. Each state has regulated the area of
public employment relations as it has seen fit and, while a particular state's
legislation might mandate a finding of preemption,'" such is not the case in
many states. Therefore, a court must look to the particular state's legislation to
determine whether it precludes suits against public unions for interference with
business relations. Assuming that no preemption problems exist, public
employers and third parties can proceed with these tort actions based on in-
terference with business relations. The following two subsections will discuss
such tort actions and their usefulness to public employers and third parties su-
ing public unions for damages resulting from illegal strikes.
1. Public Employer Actions Based on Interference With Business Relations
To establish a tortious inducement of breach of contract, a public
employer must show that the union intentionally' 85 induced the public
employees to strike in breach of provisions in the employment contracts which
prohibited strikes, and that the union was not privileged 188 to induce this
breach of contract. Inducing a breach of contract is not tortious if it is privi-
leged, in which case no liability attaches. 187
 With respect to the inducement of a
breach of public employment contracts, the California Court of Appeal in
Pasadena Unified School District v. Pasadena Federation of Teachers, Local 1050, 188
citing California case law and the Restatement of Torts, held that public
employee unions are privileged in inducing such breaches of contract where the
object and means of the action are lawful. 189 Generally, courts have deemed the
union's object to be lawful where the objective in calling the strike is to better
employment conditions, such as wages, hours, or working conditions.'" Even
if the union's objectives are permissible, however, the use of illegal means in
conducting a strike will render the calling of the strike tortious. 191 For example,
the use of violence or threats of violence, and blocking access to the employer's
premises constitute illegal means of conducting a strike.' 92 Pasadena involved a
"3 See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garman, 359 U.S. 236, 244-45 (1959). For
exceptions to this rule see PROSSER, supra note 77, 5 130 at 968-69.
1 " See supra text and notes at notes 134-66.
165 Negligent interference with contract generally has been held not actionable. 4
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 766C comment a (1977).
106 See id. 5 766. (Referring to "improper interference").
"7 See PROSSER, supra note 77, 5 129 at 942-43.
188 72 Cal. App.3d 100, 140 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1977).
169 Id. at 111, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 47.
19° PROSSER, supra note 77, 5 130 at 963.
191 Id. at 963-64.
198 Id.
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strike by public school teachers. The court ruled that because such strikes are
illegal in California the strike was neither a lawful object nor means of union
activity. 193 Therefore, the public union had not been privileged in calling the
strike and the court held that it had tortiously induced the employees' breaches
of contract. 194
While the illegality of public employee strikes will establish the union's
lack of privilege in calling a strike, the other requirement for tortious induce-
ment of breach of contract is that the individual employment contracts contain
provisions prohibiting strikes.'" If the contracts do not establish the
employees' obligation not to strike, the union's calling of a strike would not in-
duce a breach of contract.'" Absent an express contractual provision pro-
hibiting strikes, however, a court may imply a no-strike provision in a public
employee's employment contract. In Pasadena, the court followed this approach
and imposed liability on the public employee union for tortiously inducing a
breach of contract.' 9 ' Although the employment contracts at issue did not con-
tain no-strike provisions, the court noted that the laws and regulations
delineating the school board's authority were integral parts of the board's con-
tract with each teacher.'" Since California law prohibited public teacher
strikes,'°° stated the court, the school board had no authority to grant the
employees a right to strike. 200 The court therefore concluded that the legal duty
not to strike was an implicit term of each employment contract, and the union
had tortiously induced a breach of this duty by calling a strike. 2° 1
193 72 Cal. App.3d 100, 111, 140 Cal. Rptr. 41, 47-8 (1977).
194 Id. at 111, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 48. Because a strike is a form of expression, the union
argued that their first amendment rights would be violated by not permitting them to call a strike.
Id. at 108, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 45. The court rejected this contention and held the union liable for
inducing an illegal strike. Id. It declared that "insofar as speech is involved in such [concerted
labor] activity, it is only an incidence of or means to promote the commercial activities of the
union by exerting economic pressure. It is subject to restraint if either the purpose or the means
used to exert such economic pressure is unlawful." Id. The court concluded that the strong
public policy against public employee strikes outweighed any restraints on free speech. The court
distinguished, however, between speech involved in merely advocating the right of public
employees to strike and speech involved in inducing an unlawful strike. According to the court, it
could not restrain the former type of speech unless a clear and present danger were involved. Id.
at 107-10, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 45-47.
1 " Id. at 111-12, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 48. See also Lamphere Schools v. Lamphere Fed'n of
Teachers, 400 Mich. 104, 124 n.7, 252 N.W.2d 818, 827 n.7 (1977).
196 See supra note 195.
' 97 72 Cal. App. 3d 100, 111-12, 140 Cal. Rptr. 41, 48 (1977).
PH Id. at 112, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 48 (citing Fry v. Board of Educ., 17 Cal. 2d 753, 760,
112 P.2d 229, 234 (1941)).
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72 Cal. App. 3d 100, 105-07, 140 Cal. Rptr. 41, 44-45 (1977).
200 Id. at 112, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 48.
201 Id. at 112, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 48. See also Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290
U.S. 398, 429-30 (1934) (quoting Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 71 U.S. (4 Wall) 535, 550
(1866): "[T]he laws which subsist at the time and place of the making of a contract, ... enter in-
to and form a part of it, as if they were expressly referred to or incorporated in its terms.");
Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1072-73 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Schiro v. W.E.
Gould & Co., 18 Ill. 2d 538, 545 165 N.E.2d 286, 290 (1960).
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The Pasadena approach is sound and should be followed. When a public
employer cannot grant the right to strike, including a no-strike provision in the
emplOyment contracts would be a mere formality. It is reasonable to hold that,
by signing a public employment contract, the employees implicitly promise to
act in accordance with the law by refraining from striking. 202
Some courts might refuse to make the assumption that, because a state
prohibits public employee strikes, public employees implicitly were promising
to obey this law when they signed their employment contracts. These courts
might require either an explicit no-strike provision, or at least some indication
in the contracts that the public employees were obligated not to strike. For ex-
ample, a contractual agreement to resort to arbitration over disputed matters
could constitute an implicit agreement not to strike.'" A court's reluctance to
imply a no-strike provision absent some such indication would limit the
availability to public employers of actions for tortious inducement of breach of
contract.
In addition to the absence of a specific no-strike obligation in the con-
tracts, the timing of a strike also may limit the availability of tort action to
public employers. The problem of timing may arise if the individual employ-
ment contracts have expired at the time of the strike. In such a situation a
public employer might have difficulty stating a cause of action for two reasons.
First, the union could argue that in the interim between contracts the public
employees are not employed, and thus their refusal to work is not a strike. This
reasoning, however, does not accord with the idea behind the strike prohibi-
tion. The term "strike" encompasses any concerted work stoppage by
employees, whether or not they are under contract. 20' Unless employees ac-
tually quit, or are considered to have quit, 206 they are participating in a strike
regardless of the expiration of their contracts. Engaging in a concerted work
stoppage in order to obtain concessions from a public employer is precisely
what the legislature sought to prevent in proscribing public employee strikes. 2°6
202
 A breach of the employment contract would not arise from every conceivable illegal
act, however, because most illegal acts do not arise from the employment relationship. For ex-
ample, while by definition a strike cannot occur unless there is an employment relationship, a
crime such as theft is illegal regardless of whether an employment relationship exists between the
thief and the victim. Thus, it reasonably can be assumed that, in signing an employment con-
tract, a public employee implicitly promises to refrain from acts which are illegal solely because
the employee has entered the employment relationship.
20' See, e.g., Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368, 381-82 (1974).
zoo term 'strike' includes any strike or other concerted stoppage of work by
employees (including a stoppage by reason of the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement) . .. ."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1275 (rev, 5th ed. 1979) (emphasis added).
205 See, e.g. , Jarnur Prods. Corp. v. Quill, 51 Misc. 2d 501, 506 n.*, 273 N.Y.S.2d 348,
352 n.* (1966). The court said that since a statutory provision provided for automatic termina-
tion of employment (with possible reinstatement as provided) upon striking, then the strikers
were no longer employed as of the time they left the job. Id. They were therefore no longer in
violation of the strike prohibition, and "[cjlearly, plaintiffs cannot recover if their assertion of
liability is predicated upon a claim that the members of the defendant Unions could not refuse
employment by the Transit Authority." Id.
206 A strike has been defined as a work stoppage by a body of employees for the purpose
of corecing their employer to agree to a demand they have made on him. Jeffrey-DeWitt In-
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The argument that the employees are not engaging in a strike therefore is
unpersuasive.
A second reason why the timing of a strike might limit an action for tor-
tious inducement of breach of contract is that a public employer may not be
able to accuse a union of inducing the breach of contracts which have expired at
the time of the strike. 207 Thus, the extent to which the timing of the public
employee strike will curtail the usefulness of this tort action .to employers will
depend on how the court views the relationship between the employer and
employees as of the time the contracts expire. If public employees who strike
after their employment contracts have expired are still considered to be
"employed," then they still have unwritten employment contracts with their
employer. Moreover, these employees are still "employed" unless they have
quit, or are deemed to have quit by engaging in a strike. A court may take the
view that the implied employment contract continues on the same terms as the
expired written contracts until new contracts are negotiated. 208 Even if a court
were unwilling to imply into this contract all the terms of the expired contracts,
the no-strike provision logically should be an implied provision. It is the one
provision that is not subject to bargaining and will be incorporated in any new
contracts that are negotiated.'" Thus, since this no-strike provision logically
could be implied, in calling a strike the union would be inducing the public
employees to breach their unwritten contracts. Other courts, however, might
view the situation differently. Where the employment contracts had expired, a
court could conclude that a contractual relationship no longer existed between
a public employer and its employees. Because no contractual relationship ex-
isted, the union would not induce a breach of contract by calling a strike. The
public employer therefore would have to seek some other tort theory upon
which to recover damages from the union.
Where problems of timing or lack of an express no-strike provision pre-
vent a public employer from suing the striking union on a theory of tortious in-
ducement of breach of contract, the public employer still could sue the union
under the theory of interference with advantageous relations. This tort involves
the unprivileged, intentional interference with the business expectancies of
another. 21 ° Examples of a business expectancy would be the prospects of ob-
sulator Co. v. NLRB, 91 F.2d 134, 138 (4th Cir. 1937). There is no requirement that the
employees all be under contract at the time of the work stoppage for their act to constitute a
strike.
2 ° 7 In Lamphere Schools v. Lamphere Fed'n of Teachers, for example, the collective
bargaining agreement between the union and employer had expired at the time of the strike. The
union argued that the individual employment contracts were derivative contracts which expired
at the same time as the collective bargaining agreement, and, therefore, that it was impossible
for the [union] to interfere with contracts which lacked any validity." 400 Mich. 104, 127 n.7,
252 N.W.2d 818, 827 n.7 (1977). The court found it unnecessary to resolve this issue and de-
cided the case on other grounds—Id.
2 °8 See O'Brien v. Board of Educ., 70 Ill. App. 3d 604, 607-08, 388 N.E.2d 1104, 1107
(1979); Andersen v. Waco Scaffold & Equip. Co., 259 Or. 100, 105, 485 P.2d 1091, 1094 (1971).
2" See supra text and notes at notes 197-201.
21 0 Island Air, Inc. v. LaBar, 18 Wash. App. 129, 139, 566 P.2d 972, 978 (1977); PROS-
SER, supra note 77, 4 130 at 952-53.
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taining customers or employees, or some future contract. 211
 Thus, if a court
holds that a public employee union could not have induced a breach of contract
because the contracts had expired, the court nonetheless should find that the
union interfered with the public employer's business expectancies regarding
the employment of the employees whose contracts had expired. 212 The public
union therefore should be liable for such interference if it acted intentionally
and without privilege. The calling of a strike obviously would satisfy the re-
quirement of this tort that the interference be intentional. 213 Regarding the
issue of privilege, as with tortious inducement of breach of contract, a public
union is privileged in interfering with a prospective advantage only if the pur-
pose and means of the interference are proper. 214
 Since an illegal strike con-
stitutes an improper means of interference, the union's calling of the strike
would not be privileged ." 5
 A public employer therefore should succeed in su-
ing the striking union on the tort theory of interference with prospective advan-
tage.
Thus, in states which proscribe public employee strikes, tortious induce-
ment of breach of contract and tortious interference with prospective advantage
provide useful theories on which a public employer can sue a public employee
union which calls a strike. Under both theories, the illegality of public
employee strikes renders the calling of such strikes unprivileged. The
availability of both theories may be limited, however, depending on how the
courts resolve the problem arising where the employment contracts do not con-
tain express no-strike provisions. If the contracts do not contain these provi-
sions, and a court refuses to imply no-strike provisions into the contracts, then
both theories of recovery will be useless to a public employer. Absent any prob-
lems from the lack of express no-strike provisions, the determination of which
of the two theories of recovery is appropriate in a particular case will depend on
whether the public employment contracts have expired at the time of the strike.
The expiration of the contracts will make interference with prospective advan-
tage the more viable tort theory of recovery for an employer, since the ap-
plicability of this theory does not require the existence of a contract between the
public employer and employees.
2. Third Party Actions Based on Interference With Business Relations
Under the general tort of interference with business relations, the two
theories of recovery applicable to third parties are tortious interference with
contract and tortious interference with prospective advantage. The former tort
211 PROSSER, supra note 77, 130 at 950.
212 See Island Air, Inc. v. LaBar, 18 Wash. App. 129, 140, 566 P.2d 972, 978 (1977)
(Liability for unjustifiable interference with another's business relations "does not depend on
whether a contractual relationship was breached.").
213 It is possible that there may be liability for negligent interference; but a special duty
of care probably would be a prerequisite of such liability. See PROSSER, supra note 77, 5 130 at
952.
214 Id. at 952-53, 963-64.
212 Id. at 952-53 (means which are themselves unlawful result in liability for the in-
terference).
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involves the intentional, unprivileged interference with the contract of another,
whereby performance of the contract is either prevented or made more dif-
ftcult. 216 The latter tort involves the intentional unprivileged interference with
the business expectancies of another. 217 Business expectancies are advan-
tageous economic relationships which are merely prospective or potential, and
not yet contractual in nature. 218 An example of a business expectancy would be
the prospect of obtaining customers. 219 For the purposes of this discussion the
distinction between the two torts is unimportant, because the same standards
for finding intent and privilege to interfere apply to both torts.'" Thus, the two
torts will be discussed together under the general description of interference
with business relations. 22 '
If a public employee union interferes with the business relations of a third
party by engaging in a strike, the union is not liable if such interference was
privileged. This privilege arises only where the objective and the means of the
interference are proper. 222 Such interference never could be privileged in a
state which prohibits public employee strikes, since the illegality of a strike
automatically would render it an improper means of accomplishing the union's
objectives. 223 Despite its lack of privilege in striking, however, the union is
liable only for intentionally interfering with the business relations of third par-
ties.
The problem of showing that a union had this intent to interfere has
proved to be a major obstacle to third parties who have sued illegally striking
public employee unions for tortious interference with business relations. The
problem of proving intent prevented third parties from recovering in Burke &
Thomas, Inc. v. International Organization of Masters. Burke involved an illegal
strike by public ferry workers which caused economic damage to businesses
needing the ferry service in order to conduct business and attract tourists.'"
Some of these businesses sued the union for tortious interference with business
relations.'" The Washington Supreme Court held that the third parties had
not established the requisite element of intent. 226 While a strike may substan-
tially affect third parties, any detrimental effects are "incidental" results of the
strike, noted the Burke court, rather than the union's intended goal. 227 Even
216 Id. , 5 129 at 935.
'" Id. , 5 130 at 949-50.
216 Id.
215 Id. at 950.
220 See PROSSER, supra note 77, 5 129 at 947 (regarding labor unions) ("Nhe existence of
a contract, while it may still be a factor entitled to consideration, is no longer of paramount im-
portance" in establishing liability for the interference.).
221 See Island Air, Inc. v. LaBar, 18 Wash. App. 129, 139, 566 P.2d 972, 978 (1977)
(referred to these two torts generally as interference with business relationships).
222 See PROSSER, supra note 77, 5 130 at 963.
222 See supra text and notes at notes 191-94.
224 92 Wash. 2d 762, 763, 600 P.2d 1282, 1283-84 (1977).
222 Id. at 768, 600 P.2d at 1286.
226 Id. at 769, 600 P.2d at 1286-87.
227 92 Wash. 2d 762, 769, 600 P.2d 1282, 1286 (1977). See also Jamur Prods. Corp. v.
Quill, 51 Misc. 2d 501, 508-09, 273 N.Y.S.2d 348, 354-55 (1966).
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though the union can foresee this incidental harm, continued the court, 228 the
union's primary object is to apply pressure on the public employer and thereby
obtain the desired concessions. 229
 Since strikes are tools in the bargaining proc-
ess, held the court, they "are not to be construed as demonstrating an intent to
interfere with the business relations of third parties" absent evidence to the
contrary. 230
 The court therefore concluded that the union had not had the req-
uisite intent for tortious interference with business relations.
In Jamur Productions Corp. v. Quill the New York Supreme Court used
reasoning similar to that of the Burke court. Jamur involved claims by third par-
ties who had suffered economic damage as a result of an illegal strike by public
transit workers."' These businesses asserted that, by striking, the public
employee union had committed a prima facie tort. 2 " Prima facie tort is the
term used to describe the intentional, unprivileged infliction of harm on
another, and, as alleged in Jamur, is essentially the same as the tort of in-
terference with business relations."' In Jamur, as in Burke, the court found that
the element of intent was not established by the evidence.'" The Jamur court
recognized that, at least indirectly, the union did intend to harm third parties
since the public employer could "be most directly affected only by pressure
brought through inconvenience foisted upon the public. " 295
 Both courts in-
sisted, however, that because the direct object of the strike was to exert pressure
on the public employer, the union had not intended to interfere with the
economic relations of third parties in the sense required for liability to be im-
posed. 238 Moreover, the Burke and Jamur courts refused to impose liability on
the unions for incidental harm, that is, harm not directly intended by the
union, but which was certain, or substantially certain, to result from a strike."'
228
 92 Wash. 2d 762, 768-69, 600 P.2d 1282, 1286 (1977). See also Caso v. District Coun-
cil 37, AFSCME, 43 A.D.2d 159, 163, 350 N.Y.S.2d 173, 177 (1973) ("[i]t is the very in-
evitability of extensive damage which led to the prohibition of public strikes.").
229
 92 Wash. 2d 762, 769, 600 P.2d 1282, 1286 (1979).
2" Id.
23 ' 51 Misc. 2d 501, 503, 273 N.Y.S.2d 348, 349-50 (1966).
232
 Id. at 507, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 353,
233
 Prima facie tort is broader than interference with busines relations and encompasses
that tort. The two torts involve the same elements - the intentional, unprivileged infliction of harm
- yet prima facie tort is not restricted to situations involving harm to a person's business rela-
tions. See Note, Abstaining from Willful Injury - The Prima Facie Tort Doctrine, 10 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 53, 53-54 (1958). Prima facie tort has been alleged frequently in cases involving in-
terference with contractual relations and prospective advantage, however, id. at 55, and in such a
context it is identical to the tort of interference with business relations.
"4
 51 Misc. 2d 501, 508-09, 273 N.Y.S.2d 348, 354-55 (1966).
2" 51 Misc. 2d 501, 504, 273 N.Y.S.2d 348, 351 (1966).
236 Id. at 504, 509, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 351, 355 (strike directed against nobody in par-
ticular except the employer); Burke & Thomas, Inc. v. International Org. of Masters, 92 Wash.
2d 762, 769, 600 P.2d 1282, 1286 (1977).
237
 The courts pointed out that this would be an unwarranted extension of liability under
the proposed torts. Jamur Prods. Corp. v. Quill, 51 Misc. 2d 501, 509, 273 N.Y.S.2d 348, 355
(1966); Burke & Thomas, Inc. v. International Org. of Masters, 92 Wash. 2d 762, 770, 600 P.2d
1282, 1287 (1979). Both courts instead advocated judicial restraint, stating that such expansion of
liability was the province of the legislature. Jamur at 509-10, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 356-57 (1966);
Burke at 776-77, 600 P.2d at 1290 (1979). In fact, the real thrust of the opinions was the concern
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The Jamur court expressed concern over the almost unlimited liability which
would be incurred by a public union if it held that indirect, albeit intentional,
harm to third persons provided a sufficient basis for liability of the public
union. 238
In contrast to the approach of Burke and Jamur, some courts have imposed
liability for this type of incidental interference, which the defendant knew was
certain, or substantially certain, to result from his action. 239
 The Restatement
(Second) of Torts states that "[t]he interferences with the other's prospective
contractual relation is intentional if the actor desires to bring it about or if he
knows that the interference is certain or substantially certain to occur as a
result of his action."'" If this standard were applied to the facts of Burke and
Jamur, the third parties probably would have prevailed. In those cases the harm
to the public was certain, or at least substantially certain, to result from the
transit workers strike and the ferry workers strike.
Without explicitly adopting the Restatement view that parties are liable
for interference which is substantially certain to occur, the New York Supreme
Court in Burns, Jackson, Miller, Summit & Spitzer v. Lindner"' reached the result
called for by the Restatement. Burns, which, at this writing, is pending in New
York while the union appeals the denial of their motion to dismiss, involves a'
damage suit against a public employee union filed by businesses which suffered
economic injury as a result of an illegal transit strike."' In denying the motion
to dismiss, the court held that "[w]ith regard to the tort action, the element of
intent was sufficiently pled since, in light of the . . . common law rule against
public employee strikes, it could not be. maintained that the unions conduct
served any socially justifiable purpose."'" This statement indicates that the
court regarded the strong public policy against public employee strikes as a suf-
ficient reason to find that the union had the requisite intent to inflict the
foreseeable economic damage incurred by the plaintiffs.
Public employee unions should be liable for interference with the business
relations of third parties which the unions knew would be certain, or substan-
tially certain, to result from an illegal strike. Indeed, it would be consistent
with other areas of tort law to hold a public union liable for interference which
that, by increasing the scope of liability under the torts, the courts would be contravening
legislative policies and intentions regarding public employee relations. femur at 504, 506, 273
N.Y.S.2d at 351, 353 (1966); Burke at 771-75, 600 P.2d at 1288-90 (1979).
238 51 Misc. 2d 501, 509, 273 N.Y.S.2d 348, 355 (1966).
239 Keene Lumber Co. v. Leventhal, 165 F.2d 815, 822 (1st Cir. 1948); Sidney Blumen-
thal & Co. v. United States, 30 F.2d 247, 249 (2d Cir. 1929); Glover v. Lee, Higginson Corp.,
95 F. Supp. 504, 506 (D. Mass. 1950); The Poznan, 276 F. Supp. 418, 434-35 (S.D.N.Y.
1921),See also Titus v. Tacoma Smeltermen's Union Local No. 25, 62 Wash. 2d 461, 465-66, 383
P.2d 504, 507-08 (1963) (recovery not permitted since the requisite intent not found, but court
indicated that the harm would not be incidental if the defendant knows that the interference will
result).
240 4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 766B comment d (1977).
241 1980-81 Pub. Bargaining Cas. (CCH) 37,253 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. March 31, 1981)
(motion to dismiss denied).
242 Id. at 1 38,282.
243 Id,
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it knew was substantially certain to result. 244 Dean Prosser and the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts have suggested that the interference with another's
business relations should be regarded as intentional, but that its incidental
character be taken into account in determining whether the interference was
privileged. 245
 Under this approach, such interference generally would be found
unprivileged because the illegality of public employee strikes almost certainly
would outweigh the incidental character of the harm caused by such strikes.
The Burns court seems to have used the converse of this test and regarded the
unprivileged nature of the strike as a factor in determining intent. Both the
Burns approach and the Restatement suggestion that the incidental character of
the interference be a factor in determining whether the interference was
privileged seem preferable to a categorical ruling that a public union is not
liable for interference which was not the direct object of the strike. Where a
union strikes illegally and thereby causes interference with the business rela-
tions of others that was foreseeable, and perhaps intended as a means of exert-
ing pressure on the public employer, such interference should be regarded as
intentional even though it was not the direct object of the strike.
The concern expressed in Jamur that public unions would incur almost
• unlimited liability if held responsible for interference with the business rela-
tions of third parties caused by an illegal strike should not inhibit courts from
applying the standard of liability proposed by the Restatement of Torts. The
tort principles of foreseeability and proximate cause would have the salutary ef-
fect of limiting the scope of a union's liability. 42 6 Thus, even if the Restatement
standard were applied in Burke and Jamur, the plaintiffs still may have been
denied relief if the specific damage alleged was either unforeseeable or not
proximately caused by the strike. 247
 The plaintiffs in tort suits also have the
burden of proving they suffered damage.'" Thus, tort actions would be limited
244 See PROSSER, supra note 77, S 8 at 31.
"4 Id., S 129 at 942; 4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 766 comment j, 5 766B
comment d (1977).
246 " Prox imat e cause" involves a question of legal policy in determining how broad the
scope of liability will be for the consequences of an act. PROSSER, supra note 77, S 42 at 244.
"Foreseeability" is likewise a question of legal policy in determining how far to extend a defend-
ant's responsibility for the consequences of his act. Id. , S 43 at 250. To get to the issue of either
proximate cause or foreseeability, the plaintiff must first have established that his injury was in
fact caused by the defendant's act. Id. S 42 at 244, 5 43 at 250.
247 There is no standard for determining in every case whether a consequence is
foreseeable and proximately caused; different courts have used different approaches. See generally
PROSSER, supra note 77, S 42-43 at 244-70. For example, Burns, Jackson, Miller, Summit &
Spitzer v. Lindner, 1980-81 Pub. Bargaining Cas. (CCH) 37,253 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. March 31,
1981) (motion to dismiss denied) involves facts almost identical to those in Jamur Prods. Corp. v.
Quill, 51 Misc. 2d 501, 273 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1966). Unlike the Jamur court, however, the Burns
court has held, in refusing to dismiss the claim, that the damage to the businesses was a
foreseeable result of the strike. 1980-81 Pub. Bargaining Cas. (CCH) at i 38,282.
In Casa v. District Council 37, AFSCME, 43 A.D.2d 173, 177 (1973), however, the
court rejected the finding of unforeseeability in Jamur but agreed with the result in Jamur. The
court said that the damage to the businesses in Jamur was only secondarily caused by the strike,
which indicates that problems of proximate cause justified the result in Jamur. Id.
2" A plaintiff must prove that he suffered damage, Rager v. McCloskey, 305 N.Y. 75,
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to those in which the damage was specific and determinable, rather than
speculative.
A third party may have difficulty suing a public employee union on a
theory of tortious interference with business relations. The union is liable only
if it was not privileged in causing the interference and if the interference was in-
tentional. The illegality of public employee strikes will make any interference
unprivileged. There is no set standard, however, for determining whether the
requisite intent is established by incidental interference which the union knew
was certain, or substantially certain, to result from the strike. Consequently, a
third party's success with this theory of recovery will depend on the approach
taken by the particular court toward intent. While two courts that have ad-
dressed the issue have resolved it unfavorably to the third parties, other courts
might follow the approach suggested by the Restatement and rule that the in-
terference to the business relations of third parties caused by a strike was inten-
tional.
B. Tort Per Se
In Pasadena Unified School District v. Pasadena Federation of Teachers, Local
1050, the California Court of Appeal held that a public employee union which
illegally strikes, thereby causing damage to a public employer, is liable for such
damage "on a theory of direct liability for harm resulting from unlawful
acts." 249 The court based its holding on previous California cases which held
that anyone who violates the law, thereby causing harm to another, commits a
tort for which he is liable in damages.'" This concept of direct liability will be
referred to hereinafter as "tort per ie." Under this theory, the tort element of
duty arises solely from the illegality of the act. 251 The defendant is liable to
anyone he harms, not just those to whom he owed a preexisting duty, as long as
the harm occurred through the defendant's illegal act. 252 Thus, in order to
prevail on a tort per se claim, a public employer need not show that its
employees had a contractual duty not to strike; the illegality of the strike itself,
not a contractual duty, provides the basis for the claim. In addition, both
public employers and third parties can bring an action in tort per se; as long as
a public employer or third party can show an injury from the illegal act, he can
sue on a tort per se theory. 253 Since the standard of recovery in a tort per se ac-
81, 111 N.E.2d 214, 217-18 (1953); see also PROSSER, supra note 77, S 129 at 948 (nominal
damages may be awarded if plaintiff cannot show the extent of the damage suffered).
249 72 Cal. App. 3d 100, 111, 140 Cal. Rptr. 41, 48 (1977).
200 Id. at 112-13, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 48 (citing Garmon v. San Diego Bldg. Trades Coun-
cil, 49 Cal. 2d 595, 606, 320 P.2d 473, 479 (1958)).
251 72 Cal. App. 3d 100, 112, 140 Cal. Rptr. 41, 48 (1977) (the unlawful strike is itself a
tort).
"2 Id.
253 Essentially, where a public employee union strikes in violation of a statute, a tort per
se claim based on the strike is like an implied action which does not have to satisfy the criteria
traditionally required for implication. See supra text and notes at notes 41-42. The plaintiff would
not have to show that he belonged to the dass for whose special benefit the strike prohibition was
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don is the same for public employers and third parties, the two types of suit will
be discussed together.
The Pasadena court stated that a public union could not escape liability by
claiming that it did not itself strike. To the court, it was sufficient that the
union had induced and encouraged the illegal act. 2 S 4 The Restatement of Torts
provided support for this contention, in declaring that all who knowingly
order, induce, or assist the commission of an intentional tort are liable for
resulting harm."' Presumably, the basic tort principles of foreseeability and
proximate cause would limit the scope of liability in a tort per se action. 236 In
addition, like other tort actions, tort per se is unavailable if the legislature has
pre-empted the area of public employee relations and the statutory scheme
does not provide for such actions."' The Pasadena court recognized this
possibility, in deferring for future adjudication the question of whether the
newly created Educational Employment Relations Board, upon becoming ef-
fective, would have such exclusive jurisdiction over illegal strikes as to preclude
suits such as that in Pasadena. 2" Other than preemption, foreseeability and
proximate cause, however, there are no factors which might serve to restrict the
availability of a tort per se action. Thus, the scope of liability under this theory
is very broad, encompassing acts illegal at common law as well as under a
statute. 259 This theory of recovery therefore seems ideal for both public employ-
ers and third parties since they can recover damages for all injuries suffered
from an illegal strike, subject only to the limiting principles of foreseeability
and proximate cause.
Other than the Pasadena court, no courts have ruled that an illegal public
employee strike is itself a tort for which damages can be awarded. Nonetheless,
state courts have the common law power to recognize new torts as new fact
situations arise, 260
 and the Pasadena court did just that in declaring that an il-
legal public employee strike is itself a tort. The tort per se theory also may have
provided the basis for relief in State v. Kansas City Firefighters, Local 42. 261 Like
the Pasadena court, the Missouri Circuit Court in Kansas City imposed liability
enacted, or that the tort per se suit would further the policies behind the statute. Thus, tort per se
sweeps far more broadly than an implied action where a statutory violation is at issue. In addi-
tion, tort per se encompasses situations where the harm is inflicted through breach of a common
law prohibition of public employee strikes, since such a breach also constitutes a tort.
254 72 Cal. App. 3d at 113, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 49.
255 Id. (citing 4 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS S 876 (1939)).
255 See supra text and notes at note 246.
252 See supra text and notes at notes 134-66.
"4
 72 Cal. App. 3d 100, 114, 140 Cal. Rptr. 41, 49 (1977).
"9 The Pasadena court, for example, referred broadly to acts not authorized by law,
which encompasses case law and statutes. 72 Cal. App. 3d' 100, 112-13, 140 Cal. Rptr. 41, 48
(1977).
26° PROSSER, supra note 77, 1 at 3. See also Caso v. Gotbaum, 67 Misc. 2d 205, 211,
213, 323 N.Y.S.2d 742, 749, 751 (1971), rev'd on other grounds, 38 A.D.2d 955, 331 N.Y.S.2d 507
(1972) (courts should not reject a claim merely because it is novel; they should be prepared to
create new torts as the need arises).




on a public employee union for damages resulting from an illegal strike. 262 Kan-
sas City involved a suit against a firefighter's union by a third party, the State of
Missouri, which incurred the expense of providing , Kansas City with fire pro-
tection while the union illegally was engaged in a strike.'" The court did not
denominate the suit as a tort action, although one commentator has classified it
as such. 264 In fact, the court's holding more clearly reflects a quasi-contractual
analysis. 265 Much of the court's reasoning, however, could have provided the
basis for a tort recovery had either the public employer or a third party sued for
damages incurred as a result of the strike. The court's analysis delineated the
classic tort elements of duty and breach of duty. The court stated first that
public employee strikes were prohibited in Missouri both by statute and at
common law. 266 The firemen thus had a legal obligation and responsibility to
provide fire protection services to Kansas City and its citizens, 267 reasoned the
court, and the firemen willfully and intentionally breached this duty with
knowledge of the harmful consequences to the city and its citizens.'" Given
this analysis, it seems likely that if a public employer or a member of the public
had suffered damages as a result of the strike, it could have recoverd from the
union on a tort per se theory. 269
In contrast to the Pasadena court's adoption of a tort per se theory, other
courts either explicitly or implicitly have rejected the tort per se approach and
have indicated that the mere occurrence of an illegal strike which causes harm
to some parties is not a sufficient basis for damage liability.'" As a prerequisite
to liability these courts have required that the union owe a preexisting duty to
the injured parties. Unlike the Pasadena court, these courts have not regarded
the general duty to avoid committing illegal acts which result in harm to others
as a duty upon which liability could be based. For example, the Lamphere court
held that the case which had established the common law prohibition of public
employee strikes"' in Michigan had held only that public employee strikes
were illegal and thus subject to injunction. 272 The case, in the Lamphere court's
view, fell "far short of creating the classic 'duty', 'breach of duty', therefore,
262 Id. at 1 21,471.
265 Id. at 1 21,469.
264 Jackson, supra note 19, at 83.
265 See infra text and notes at notes 356-63.
266 2 Pub. Bargaining Cas. (CCH) 1 20,438 at 21,474 (Mo. Cir. Ct. 1976). .
267 Id. at 1 21,475.
268 Id.
269 They could recover, of course, only for harm that was foreseeable and proximately
caused by the strike. See supra text and note at note 246.
"0 See, e.g. , Lamphere Schools v. Lamphere Fed'n of Teachers, 400 Mich. 104, 128,
252 N.W.2d 818, 829 (1977); Jamur Prods. Corp. v. Quill, 51 Misc. 2d 501, 506, 510, 273
N.Y.S.2d 348, 352-53, 355 (1966); Fairmont v. Retail, Wholesale and Dept. Store Union,
1979-80 Pub. Bargaining Cas. (CCH) i 37,157 at 38,124 (W. Va. 1980).
7" Detroit v. Division 26 of the Amalgamated Ass'n of St. Elec. Ry. and Motor Coach
Employees, 332 Mich. 237, 248-49, 51 N.W.2d 228, 233 (1952).
272 Lamphere Schools v. Lamphere Fed'n of Teachers, 400 Mich. 104, 128, 252
N.W.2d 818, 829 (1977).
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`monetary damages' triad of traditional tort law. " 273
 The court also noted that
the common law prohibited public employee strikes in order to protect the
public, 274
 not public employers. Thus the public unions owed no tort duty to
the employers not to strike."' Michigan case law thus contained no precedent
which established an illegal public employee strike as a tort. 278 Courts in other
states have reached a similar result."' Moreover, like the Lamphere court, these
courts have declined to exercise their common law power to create a new tort
action, since they have deemed it to be within the legislature's province to pro-
vide for actions against illegally striking public employee unions. 278
In states that prohibit public employee strikes by statute and have pro-
vided express remedies for violations of the statute, courts should hesitate to
adopt the tort per se theory of direct liability for an illegal strike. This approach
is proper because courts run the risk of contravening legislative policies and in-
tent by establishing new causes of action where the legislature has already
enacted a remedial scheme. In such cases, courts should adhere strictly to the
established criteria for implication279
 in deciding whether to recognize new
causes of action. In states where the only prohibition of public employee strikes
is the common law, however, the tort per se approach of direct liability for
harm caused by the illegal strike would be appropriate since there is no legisla-
tion with which the action can conflict. Nonetheless, even in these states the
few courts that have addressed the issue have not taken a tort per se approach
against illegally striking public employee unions. One court refused to find that
the striking union owed to individual members of the public a duty not to
strike. 28° Another court held that, despite the illegality of public employee
strikes at common law, a peaceful strike directed only against the public
employer did not give rise to any common law action for damages for the
272
274 " Strikes by public school teachers are against public policy because they deprive the
public of necessary educational services." Id.
275 Id.
276 Id. at 124-29, 252 N.W.2d at 827-29.
277
	 supra note 270.
278 Lamphere Schools v. Lamphere Fed'n of Teachers, 400 Mich. 104, 133, 252
N.W.2d 818, 831 (1977); Jamur Prods. Corp. v. Quill, 51 Misc. 2d 501, 506, 510, 273 N.Y.S.2d
348, 353, 357 (1966); Fairmont v. Retail, Wholesale & Dept. Store Union, 1979-80 Pub.
Bargaining Cas. (CCH) 1 37,157 at 38,124 (W. Va. 1980) See also Fulenwider v. Firefighters
Ass'n Local 1784, 1979-80 Pub. Bargaining Cas. (CCH) 1 36,956 at 37,757 (Tenn. Ct. App.
June 2, 1980) (court declared it knew "of no duty imposed upon a firemen's union to furnish
adequate fire protection to an individual property owner" and that it had "no inclination to ..
create such a duty").
279 See supra text and notes at notes 41-42.
280
 Fulenwider v. Firefighters Ass'n Local 1784, 1979-80 Pub. Bargaining Cas. (CCH)
1 36,956 at 37,757 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 2, 1980). The court imposed liability on the union,
however, on the more traditional theory of nuisance, under which the union's duties are well
established. Id. at 37,757-59. For a discussion of nuisance, see infra text and notes at notes
283-313.
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employer. 28 ' There was no precedent for any tort action in these circumstances
and the court refused to create a new tort action. 282
Generally, courts have not applied the Pasadena approach of designating
an illegal public employee strike as a tort per se and holding a public employee
union liable for any harm resulting from an illegal strike. The courts instead
have preferred traditional tort theories with clearly defined standards of duty
and breach of duty. Therefore, rather than rely exclusively on an action in tort
per se, third parties and public employers should try to bring actions under
established tort theories. One theory which may prove very useful is nuisance.
C. Public Employee Strikes as Constituting a Nuisance
A final tort theory under which third parties and public employers may
sue illegally striking public employee unions is an action for nuisance. There
are two types of nuisance actions — public and private. A public nuisance is
any unreasonable interference with the exercise of rights common to all
members of the public. 288 A private nuisance is an interference with the use
and enjoyment of one's land.'" To constitute either a public or private
nuisance, an act must be unreasonable" and must cause substantial
damage. 286 The determination of reasonableness involves a balancing of the
utility of the act against the harm it causes. 287 Since an illegal public employee
strike violates the law, it can be viewed as inherently unreasonable. 288
Presumably the legislature already has weighed the interests involved and has
decided that the harm caused by such strikes outweighs any utility they may
have. 289 The determination of whether the harm caused is substantial depends
on the facts of the case, but generally, any damage to property qualifies as
substantia1. 28° Absent such damage, the harm must be so offensive, annoying
or inconvenient that it would upset the normal person. 2" Many public
employee strikes conform to this standard, as they can cause great harm or in-
convenience to the public. Examples of such substantial harm would be the
great danger to the public posed by a police or firefighter's strike 292 or the great
281 Fairmont v. Retail, Wholesale and Dept. Store Union, 1979-80 Pub. Bargaining
Cas. (CCH) 41 37,157 at 38,124 (W. Va. 1980).
282 Id.
285 4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 821B (1977).
284 Id., S 821D.
285 PROSSER, supra note 77, S 87 at 580.
288 Id. at 577.
287 Id. at 581.
288 Harvard Note, supra note 44, at 1330.
289 Id.
290 PROSSER, supra note 77, 5 87, at 578.
291 Id.
292 See Wohlers, supra note 14, at 46 (clear and present danger. is involved in police and
firefighter strikes).
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inconvenience and hardship caused by a transit strike.'" Thus, since illegal
public employee strikes are inherently unreasonable and often cause substan-
tial harm, many of these strikes could provide the basis for nuisance actions.
Both third parties and public employers may be able to bring a public
nuisance action against an illegally striking public employee union. A public
nuisance suit may be brought by a public official, on behalf of the public, for
purposes of enjoining the nuisance. 294 In order to recover damages for a public
nuisance, however, a party must show that the harm he has suffered differs in
kind, rather than merely in degree, from that suffered by other members of the
public."' For example, one court permitted a third party to recover damages
from a firefighter's union for damage to his property which burned during an
illegal firefighter's strike.'" The theory of recovery was public nuisance."' The
court held that the public suffered the common injury of being without fire pro-
tection, while the individual plaintiff suffered a special injury because his prop-
erty actually was destroyed.'" A third party generally can satisfy the require-
ment of harm different in kind where he suffers an injury to his person or prop-
erty."'
Difficulties arise, however, where the loss is purely economic, such as lost
profits, and does not arise from physical harm or damage to property. 30° It has
been asserted that economic harm suffered by businesses as the result of a
transit strike does not qualify as a particular kind of injury. 30 ' This assertion
applies to profits lost through the lack of customers, since all businesses in the
area suffer this injury. In Burns, however, the New York Supreme Court has
reached the opposite conclusion regarding economic harm as a "particular"
kind of injury. In denying the public union's motion to dismiss, the court ruled
that "the nuisance complaint was sufficient since it alleged pecuniary damages
which were particular to professional and business enterprises operating for
293 See Jamur Prods. Corp. v. Quill, 51 Misc. 2d 501, 502, 273 N.Y.S.2d 348, 349
(1966) (transit strike had "awesome impact" on country).
294
 PROSSER, supra note 77, $ 90 at 604.
296 Id. , $ 88 at 587; Fulenwider v. Firefighters Local 1784, 1979-80 Pub. Bargaining
Cas. (CCH) 1 36,956 at 37,758 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. 1980).
296
 Fulenwider v. Firefighters Local 1784, 1979-80 Pub. Bargaining Cas. (CCH)
36,956 at 37,756 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. 1980).
"7 Id. at 37,759.
298 Id
299
 PROSSER, supra note 77, $ 88 at 588.
'°° Of course, where the pecuniary loss is of a kind particular to the plaintiff, as where he
is prevented from performing a contract, he may recover; the contract is not something common
to members of the public. PROSSER, supra note 77, $ 88 at 590-91. Where a large segment of the
public suffers the same type of pecuniary loss, however, no one individual may recover. Id.
3°' See Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REV. 997, 1010-11, 1015
(1966) (In such a case, widespread economic losses will occur and it will be difficult to show that
pecuniary losses are different in kind rather than in degree.). See also Jamur Prods. Corp. v.
Quill, 51 Misc. 2d 501, 509, 273 N.Y.S.2d 348, 355 (1966) (economic losses suffered by plaintiffs
during a transit strike were considered no different in kind from those suffered by the rest of the
public).
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profit. " 302 Thus, the court decided that the economic harm suffered by the
businesses differed in kind from the harm suffered by other third parties during
the strike. Burns, however, appears to be the minority view. Thus, where a
public employee strike causes widespread economic harm, a third party may
have problems establishing that his economic injury differed in kind from the
other economic harm inflicted by the strike.
Normally, public officials may sue on behalf of the public only to enjoin a
public nuisance. 5" There may be situations, however, where a public official is
permitted to bring a suit for damages for public nuisance. Caso v. District Council
37, AFSCME304 was such a suit. In Caso, the New York Supreme Court
awarded some municipalities damages for nuisance when an illegal public
employee strike caused the pollution of beaches owned by the municipalities. 3 °5
The court found that the strike was willful and malicious, that it endangered
the lives and health of the public, and that it caused considerable damage to the
environment.'" As a result, the court decided that the municipalities had a
cause of action in nuisance. The court, however, did not specify whether the
cause of action was for public or private nuisance.'" Thus, it is not clear that
Caso involved a public nuisance recovery, since Caso has been categorized both
as a private nuisance508 case and a public nuisance case."' Caso can be
classified plausibly as a public nuisance recovery. The damage to the environ-
ment and the danger to the public certainly constituted a public nuisance, and
the municipalities suffered the particular injury of having damage done to their
land.
Whatever the rationale behind the recovery by the municipalities in Casa,
it seems manifestly fair, albeit somewhat unorthodox, to allow government en-
tities to recover damages on a public nuisance theory where an illegal strike
creates a public nuisance and also causes a particular kind of harm to a govern-
ment entity. An award of damages to a government entity is particularly ap-
propriate in a situation like that in Caso, where an injunction would have been
ineffective to prevent the harm. At present it is unclear, however, whether
other courts will follow the Caso example and permit damage suits by govern-
ment entities on a public nuisance theory.
Even if government entities were not permitted to recover damages on a
public nuisance theory, the recovery by the municipalities in Caso was war-
302 1980-81 Pub. Bargaining Cas. (CCH) 137,253 at 38,282 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. March 31,
1981) (motion to dismiss denied).
3°' PROSSER, supra note 77, S 90 at 604.
"4, 43 A.D.2d 159, 350 N.Y.S.2d 173 (1973).
3 °3 Id. at 160-61, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 175.
3°6 Id. at 162-63, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 177.
"7 Id. at 163, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 178.
3 °6 It was classified as a private nuisance in Harvard Note, supra note 44, at 1328.
309 It was classified as a public nuisance in Burke & Thomas, Inc. v. International Org.
of Masters, 92 Wash. 2d 762, 768, 600 P.2d 1282, 1286 (1979) and in Jackson, supra note 19, at
82.
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ranted on a theory of private nuisance. Caso exemplifies those situations in
which recovery can be predicated on a theory of either public or private
nuisance. The two theories overlap to the extent that, where a public nuisance
has the effect of interfering with a person's use and enjoyment of his land, he
has a cause of action for private as well as public nuisance."° In such a case, in-
jury to the land provides the basis for both a private nuisance action and the
"particular injury" required for a public nuisance recovery. Thus, because of
the municipalities' status as injured landowners in Caso, they should have been
allowed to rely on either nuisance theory. In such cases, where both theories
are available to a plaintiff, courts have permitted plaintiffs to proceed on either
or both theories. 311
 Plaintiffs may proceed on either theory even where other
landowners have suffered the same type of harm, 312 which ordinarily would
rule out a public nuisance recovery since the plaintiff has not suffered a par-
ticular type of harm. Harm to one's land, however, is deemed particular
enough to permit recovery for nuisance even if other landowners have suffered
the same harm. 313
 Thus, if an illegal public employee strike causes harm suffi-
ciently widespread to constitute a public nuisance and the strike also causes in-
terference with a third party's use of his land, that third party should be able to
proceed on either nuisance theory. Where the third party is a government enti-
ty, that party also should be granted recovery for harm to its land, though it is
unclear whether the recovery is for public or private nuisance.
Similarly, where the government entity is not a third party, but is a public
employer, the employer should be allowed to bring either a public or a private
nuisance suit for any damage done to government land for which the public
employer is responsible. Where no damage to government land is involved,
however, a private nuisance suit would be unavailable and the viability of a
public nuisance suit would be questionable. Because there is little authority for
a government entity asserting a claim for damages for public nuisance, 314 a
public employer should try to allege a more traditional tort. Due to the in-
herently unreasonable nature of an illegal public employer strike, however,
and the substantial damage often caused by such strikes, a nuisance theory
may provide a viable route to recovery for a third party. The third party should
succeed if he can show interference with his use of his land, or some other type
of particular injury not shared by the rest of the public. 3 "
31 ° PROSSER, supra note 77, S 88 at 588-89.
311 Id. at 589.
312 Id.
" 3 Id.
3" The only case found by this author which could be characterized as a public nuisance
recovery by a government entity is Casa v. District Council 37, AFSCME, 43 A.D.2d 159, 350
N.Y.S.2d 173 (1973).
3" Under all of the tort theories, in addition to compensatory damages, a public
employer or third party might recover punitive damages. See, e.g. , State v. Fire Fighters, Local
42, 2 Pub. Bargaining Cas. (CCH) i 20,438 at 21,472 (Mo. Cir. Ct. 1976) (punitive damages
granted against striking firefighters to deter them and others from striking, since such strikes
posed great threat to citizens); Caso v. Gotbaum, 67 Misc. 2d 205, 212, 323 N.Y.S.2d 742, 750
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III. CONTRACT THEORIES OF RECOVERY
In all of the tort actions previously described, the illegality of public
employee strikes constituted an essential element of the tort action. No
agreements between a public employer and public union could change the il-
legality of the strike. Contract actions, however, generally can be brought by
public employers and third parties against public unions regardless of the
general legality of public employee strikes. A contract action is predicated on
the union's breach of a contractual obligation not to strike, rather than on a
statutory or common law duty not to strike. Thus, a cause of action in contract
might be the only available theory of recovery for a public employer or third
party in a state where the public employee strike is legal.
There are three possible contract actions available against an illegally
striking public employee union. First, a public employer may be able to sue a
union for breach of contract if a public employee strike is in violation of a provi-
sion in the collective bargaining agreement prohibiting strikes. In addition,
third parties may be able to bring suit against a public union on a third party
beneficiary theory. Under this theory, if the union and public employer
entered into a collective bargaining agreement for the benefit of the public,
members of the public may be able to bring suit as third party beneficiaries of
the contract should the union breach the terms of the agreement. Finally, a
quasi-contractual theory of recovery may be available to certain third parties
who intervene and fulfill the union's contractual duties while the strike lasts.
The contract causes of action available to public employers will be examined
(1971), rev'd, 38 A.D.2d 955, 331 N.Y.S.2d 509 (1972) (plaintiff granted punitive damages from
union which went on strike and thereby willfully and maliciously caused sewage to pollute waters
and contaminate the environment). In Pasadena Unified School Dist. v. Pasadena Fed'n of
Teachers, Local 1050, the court sanctioned the imposition of punitive damages against a
teacher's union which engaged in an illegal one-day strike. 72 Cal. App.3d 100, 104-05, 140 Cal.
Rptr. 41, 43-44 (1977).
The award of punitive damages against a public union which illegally strikes, however,
has been criticized as contrary to the public policy favoring the continued existence of public
employee unions, since these damages could cripple or destroy a union. See Pasadena Unified School
District v. Pasadena Federation of Teachers: A Limited Right to Strike for the Public School Teacher, 10 Sw.
U.L. REV. 931, 941-42 (1978). See also IBEW v. Forest, 442 U.S. 42, 48 (1979) (punitive
damages could impair financial stability of unions).
In some instances, however, the public policy of preventing public employee strikes
outweighs any concern for a particular union's existence. In such instances, the deterrent effect
of awarding punitive damages justifies the award. See State v. Kansas City Firefighters, Local 42,
2 Pub. Bargaining Cas. (CCH) 1 20,438 at 21,472 (Mo. Cir. Ct. 1976) (court awarded punitive
damages to deter essential employees from striking and recklessly endangering the public). See
also Caso v. Gotbaum, 67 Misc. 2d 205, 213, 323 N.Y.S.2d 742, 751 (1971), rev'd, 38 A.D.2d
955, 331 N.Y.S.2d 509 (1972) ("[T]he sanction of punitive damage must overhang those who
would for their own ends wound the public interest in its environment.").
Furthermore, a jury can impose punitive damages in an amount short of that needed to
destroy the union, and still obtain the desired deterrent effect. In deciding how much punitive
damages, if any, to award, the jury should consider mitigating circumstances in assessing the
willfulness of the illegal strike. For example, if the public employer played some role in in-
stigating the strike, such as by bargaining unfairly, that factor should be reflected in the decision
whether to award punitive damages.
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first. A discussion of possible contract claims of third parties against illegally
striking public employee unions will follow.
A. Contract Suits by Public Employers
Three states explicitly authorize suits for breach of contract by public
employers against public employee unions. 3 " Five other states have enacted
general provisions for employer suits against the public unions, and these pro-
visions seemingly encompass breach of contract suits. 3 " Case law in four other
states has established that public employees or employers can bring contract
actions for violations of a collective bargaining agreernent. 3 " In one state,
however, it has been held that courts may not hear damage actions for breaches
of collective bargaining agreements. 319
 Only these few states thus far have ad-
dressed the issue of permitting public employers to bring breach of contract
suits against the unions.
Although most states do not yet offer guidelines on this matter, an analogy
to the regulation of private sector labor relations provides persuasive reasons
for allowing public employers to sue public employee unions for breach of con-
tract. Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) provides
that suits for the violation of a collective bargaining agreement may be brought
by either employers or unions. 320
 Although section 301 does not specifically
provide for a damage action,"' courts have implied one. 322
 Congress enacted
96 See ALASKA STAT. 5 23.40.020 (1972); IOWA CODE ANN. 5 20.17(5) (West 1978);
Ky. REV. STAT. 5 345.100(3) (1977).
"' IND. CODE ANN. $ 20-7.5-1-14(b) (Burns 1975) (school employers may, through any
proper proceeding at law or in equity, take action against teacher's organizations which illegally
strike); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 273-A:15 (1977) ("Actions by or against the exclusive
representative of a [public employee] bargaining unit may be brought, without respect to the
amount of damages, in the superior court . ."). See also FLA. STAT. ANN. 5 447.507(4) (West
1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. 5 179,68-3(11) & 5 179.68-'1 (West Supp. 1981); WIS. STAT. ANN. 5
111.89(2)(c) (West 1974). These statutes authorize damage suits by an employer in the event of a
public employee strike, without specifying whether the cause of action is in tort or contract.
3 " See Local No. 404, IAFF v. City of Walla Walla, (PERC 1976) Case No. U-76-45
(405), Dec. No. 104 PECB, cited in 2 Pub. Bargaining Cas. (CCH) Washington 7025 (1978).
Washington follows the federal rule and permits the use of contract enforcement suits identical to
$ 301 suits under the NLRA. See also IAFF, Local No. 630 v. City of Livingston, (BPA 1974),
ULP No. 2 (Mont. Bd. Pers. App. 1974, cited in 2 Pub. Bargaining Rep. (CCH) Mont. i 7025
(1980)) (collective bargaining agreements may be enforced through civil actions in the ap-
propriate court); Milford Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 167 Conn. 513, 520, 356 A.2d 109, 112
(1975) (union could have sued employer for breach of collective bargaining agreement); Morris
v. Board of Educ., 2 Pub. Bargaining Cas. (CCH) 1 20,396 at 21,317 (D. Del. 1975) (teacher
can sue school board for breach of collective bargaining agreement).
3 " Boothbay Region Teachers Ass'n v, Boothbay School Comm., (PELRB 1975) Case
Nos. 74-04, 74-05 & 74-06, cited in 2 Pub. Employee Bargaining Rep. (CCH) Maine 7025. The
aggrieved party, however, can seek injunctive relief from the superior court if the other party
breaches a statutory duty. Id.
3" 29 U.S.C. 5 185(a) (1976).
321 Id.
322 See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 196-97 (1967); Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370
U.S. 238, 239-40, 241, 244 (1962). See also Arouca, supra note 20, at 799. In S 301 actions "courts
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section .301 as an exception to the exclusive authority of the NLRB in dealing
with private sector labor disputes, 323
 to recognize the importance of imposing
on both employers and unions the responsibility of acting in accordance with
contractual promises. 324
 A senate committee declared that "statutory recogni-
tion of the collective bargaining agreement as a valid, binding, and enforceable
contract is a logical and necessary step. It will promote a higher degree of
responsibility upon the parties to such agreements, and will thereby promote
industrial peace. " 325
 These observations, it is suggested, apply as well to public
sector labor relations. If it is the legislative policy to promote labor peace be-
tween public employers and employees, the availability of contract remedies to
both labor and management should further this policy. It could prove very
disruptive to labor relations if either party could violate the terms of collective
bargaining agreements with impunity. 326
 The parties would have less incentive
to abide by the agreement and breaches might occur more frequently, thus
threatening labor peace. Thus, even though most states have not enacted pro-
visions analogous to section 301 of the LMRA, courts should hesitate to find
that contract actions have been preempted by legislation regulating public
employees.
The general policy of encouraging contracting between parties by holding
all parties liable for fulfillment of their contractual duties 327 also supports the
granting of contract remedies to public employers. If the parties have no
recourse to the courts in the event of contract violations, they might have less
desire to enter into a contractual relationship. The existence of a stable contrac-
tual relationship should help to minimize disputes between the parties and the
consequent disruptions in government services. There would be little point in
contractually defining the rights and duties of the parties if there were no
means of enforcing compliance with the agreement. The policy of encouraging
contracts between public employers and employees therefore favors the exten-
sion of contract remedies to parties to public employee collective bargaining
agreements.
Of course, the availability of a breach of contract action for public
employers presupposes a contractual obligation of the union not to strike. In
implied whatever remedies, including damages, that were necessary and appropriate to vindica-
tion of the congressional scheme." Id. at 812; Note, Parent Union Liability for Strikes in Breach of
Contract, 67 CAL. L. REV, 1028, 1028 (1979) (S 301 authorizes damage actions).
323 Charles Dowd Box Co., Inc. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 513 (1962).
324 S. REP. NO. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-18 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 407 (1948)
(hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY). See also Arouca, supra note 20, at 811 & n.145.
325 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 324, at 17.
"6 See Parent Union Liability, supra note 322, at 1030 (citing Senator Taft's speech in
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 324, at 16. See also supra text and note at note 325.
327 "Without some effective method of assuring freedom from economic warfare for the
term of the agreement, there is little reason why an employer would desire to sign [the collective
bargaining agreement]." Parent Union Liability, supra note 322, at 1030 (citing Senator Taft's
speech in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 324, at 16).
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the absence of an express contractual no-strike provision, courts in a state
which prohibits public employee strikes may imply such a provision into all
public employee collective bargaining agreements."' A court logically can im-
ply this obligation into public employee collective bargaining agreements
because such a provision should not be subject to bargaining. 329
 Since both
parties know of the illegality of a strike and bargain under the assumption that
the union will not strike, the court could deem the union to have agreed to com-
ply with the law and refrain from striking. 3" If the court implies such a provi-
sion, a public employer can proceed with a breach of contract suit against a
striking union.
Some courts might require an explicit contractual provision prohibiting
strikes to limit the availability of breach of contract suits. 331
 Such a require-
ment, however, may fail to acknowledge the intent of the parties in negotiating
the contract. It is reasonable to assume that the public employer enters into a
collective bargaining agreement with the underlying expectation that the union
will not break the law by calling a strike. An illegal strike obviously is possible,
but contractual silence on the issue should not be interpreted as indicating the
employer's tacit acceptance of a strike by the union. In bargaining with a
union, public employers do not have the authority to agree even tacitly to
something which is illega1. 332
 Therefore, courts should not require an explicit
no-strike provision. Even if a court implies a no-strike provision into a collec-
tive bargaining agreement, the timing of a strike might preclude a suit for
breach of contract for the same reasons that it could preclude suits for tortious
inducement of breach of contract. 333
 Arguably, the contractual obligation not
to strike cannot extend beyond the duration of the contract. Thus, if the strike
occurs after the collective bargaining agreement has expired, the public union
cannot be guilty of breaching the contract by striking. As one commentator
noted, however, extending the obligation not to strike "would seem to be the
very purpose of the statute [prohibiting strikes], since a strike can be defined
only in terms of a preexisting obligation. As these obligations are defined by
contract, it is reasonable to regard the continuance of those obligations as con-
tractual in nature."'" Thus, it persuasively can be argued that a union has a
contractual obligation to refrain from striking that extends beyond the term of
the contract.
Where the timing of a strike and the absence of an express no-strike provi-
sion present no problems, public employee unions should be held liable for
their contractual obligations in the same fashion as any other party to a con-
322 See supra text and notes at notes 197-201.
322 Id.
33° Id.
"' See supra text and note at note 203.
332 See Pasadena Unified School Dist. v. Pasadena Fed'n of Teachers, 72 Cal. App.3d
100, 112, 140 Cal. Rptr. 41, 48 (1977).
233 See supra text and notes at notes 204-09.
3" Harvard Note, supra note 44, at 1321 n.57.
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tract."' As Congress has declared, collective bargaining agreements will be
meaningful only if they can be enforced through the usual processes of the
law. 336 In the absence of legislation regarding contract remedies, the courts
therefore should permit public employers to bring breach of contract suits
against unions which strike in breach of contract.
B. Contract Suits by Third Parties
Third parties are less likely than public employers to succeed on a contract
theory in an action against a public employee union which illegally goes on
strike. Since the third parties themselves have not contracted with the union,
they must rely on a third party beneficiary theory of recovery. Under this
theory, a contract entered into for the benefit of a third party may be enforced .
by that party. 337 The few courts that have been confronted with this claim by
third parties who have suffered damage from an illegal public employee strike
have rejected the third party beneficiary theory. 338 These courts have focused
on problems of intent. They have required explicit evidence in the contract that
the employer and the union intended to establish the public, or certain
members of the public, as third party beneficiares of the collective bargaining
agreement. 339
This high standard for showing intent to establish a third party beneficiary
has been confined to cases concerning contracts for the provision of govern-
ment services to the public. 340 In the non-governmental services context, ex-
plicit evidence of intent in the contract is not required to establish a third party
beneficiary."' The heightened requirement for establishing intent in the
government services context reflects the fear that contractors might be reluc-
tant to enter into contracts with the government if such contracts might expose
them to liability to the public for negligence or inability to perform. 342 This
concern, however, does not apply to public employee strikes. Whereas the .
possibility of negligence or inability to perform may be unavoidable to a con-.
tractor, the decision to risk liability for damage caused by a strike remains with'
3" See Arouca, supra note 20, at 814 n.157 (it is in union's best interest to assume finan-
cial responsibility for their unlawful acts).
"6 See supra text and notes at notes 318-19.
'37 See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 17-1 at 606 (2d ed.. .
1977).
33" See Burke & Thomas, Inc. v. International Org. of Masters, 92 Wash. 2d 762,
767-68, 600 P.2d 1282, 1285-86 (1979); Burns, Jackson, Miller, Summit & Spitzer v. Lindner,
1980-81 Pub. Bargaining Cas. (CCH) 1 37,253 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. March 31, 1981) (motion to
dismiss denied; court held third-party beneficiary theory unavailable).
33" Burke & Thomas, Inc. v. International Org. of Masters, 92 Wash. 2d 762, 767-68, ,
600 P.2d 1282, 1286 (1979); Burns, Jackson, Miller, Summit & Spitzer v. Lindner, 1980-81
Pub. Bargaining Cas. (CCH) 1 37, 253 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. March 31, 1981) (motion to dismiss
denied).
'4° Harvard Note, supra note 44, at 1322-23.
3 . 1 Id. at 1323.
342 Id. at 1326-27.
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the union. The union can avoid liability by not striking. The potential liability
may deter the union from striking but should not deter it from entering into a
collective bargaining agreement. 343
 Thus, where a public employee collective
bargaining agreement is involved, it seems unnecessary to apply the strict
standard for showing intent to establish a third party beneficiary that is or-
dinarily applied in the case of a contract for the provision of government serv-
ices. Courts nonetheless have applied the strict standard in cases where third
parties have sought to recover damages from an illegally striking public union
on a third party beneficiary theory. 344
In applying the strict standard for intent to a government services con-
tract, some courts have held such contracts to establish the public as third party
beneficiaries even if the contract did not expressly declare that intent. 345 These
courts have ruled that the contract established the public as third party
beneficiary if the government had an obligation to provide to the public the
services for which the public employer contracted with the union. 346
 In finding
this obligation, some courts have held that when a government entity under-
takes the provision of certain services, it assumes a duty to provide those serv-
ices satisfactorily.' 47
In determining whether members of the public are third party
beneficiaries of public employment collective bargaining agreements, courts
have made a distinction between duties the government owes to the public at
large and duties the government owes to individual members of the public. 348
Only the latter type of duty provides the basis for a third party beneficiary
suit.'" Those public sector services provided directly to members of the public,
rather than merely made available to the public at large, constitute services
owed to individual members of the public."° For example, water is provided
343 Id. at 1327.
944
	 supra text and note at note 339.
3" See, e.g., Lopez v. Arizona Water Co., 23 Ariz. App. 99, 101, 530 P.2d 1132, 1134
(1975); Jenree v. Metropolitan St. Ry., 86 Kan. 479, 482-85, 121 P. 510, 511-12 (1912).
346
 See supra note 345. See also Burns, Jackson, Miller, Summit & Spitzer v. Lindner,
1980-81 Pub. Bargaining Cas. (CCH) 1 37,253 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. March 31, 1981) (motion to
dismiss denied; union owed no contractual duty to members of public unless contract clearly
established such duty or government had duty to provide to the public the contracted-for services;
court found no such government duty to provide transit services to the public). See also Harvard
Note, supra note 44, at 1323. But see Burke & Thomas, Inc. v. International Org. of Masters, 92
Wash. 2d 762, 767, 600 P.2d 1282, (1979), where the court acknowledged the state's obligation
to provide the service to the public, yet still required explicit contractual intent to establish the
public as third party beneficiaries.
347 See, e.g., Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235, 240 (Alaska 1976); Veach v. City of Phoenix,
102 Ariz. 195, 197, 427 P.2d 335, 337 (1967). See also Harvard Note, supra note 44, at 1324.
Other courts, such as the New York court in Burns, Jackson, Miller, Summit & Spitzer v. Lind-
ner, 1980-81 Pub. Bargaining Cas. (CCH) i 37,253 at 38,283 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. March 31, 1981)
(motion to dismiss denied), have been less liberal in finding this duty. The Bums court stated that
the government had no duty to provide transit services to the public. Id.
346
 J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, 17-5 at 617 (2d ed. 1977).
'4° Id.
"° See, e.g., International Ry. Co. v. Rann, 224 N.Y. 83, 87-8, 120 N.E. 153, 154
(1918); Farnsworth v. Boro Oil & Gas Co., 216 N.Y. 40, 43-44, 48, 109 N.E. 860, 861, 863
(1915); Pond v. New Rochelle Water Co., 183 N.Y. 330, 338, 76 N.E. 211, 214 (1906).
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directly to the members of the public, while police and fire protection are mere-
ly available to those particular citizens who may require such services."' Thus,
contracts into which a government enters to insure the provision of water to the
members of the public should provide the basis for a third party beneficiary
suit. Services such as police and fire protection, however, which are not pro-
vided directly to members of the public, are more difficult to characterize as
owed to the public at large or to individual members of the public. This dif-
ficulty of distinguishing between the two types of duty has led one court to
declare that "[a]ny duty owed to the public generally is a duty owed to in-
dividual members of the public. " 352 Generally, however, courts have sought to
apply the distinction. 353
Third parties thus face several problems in trying to sue a striking public
employee union on a third party beneficiary theory. First, they must prove that
the parties to the collective bargaining agreement intended to establish them as
third party beneficiaries of the agreement. Even if the third parties can
establish that they are intended beneficiaries of the collective bargaining agree-
ment, they may be unable to recover on a third party beneficiary theory if the
services provided by striking public employees are services owed by the govern-
ment to the public at large rather than to individual members of the public. In
addition, third parties may confront the same problems of timing and lack of
an express no-strike provision facing public employers who seek to bring
breach of contract suits against striking unions. 354 A contract damage remedy
therefore may prove less useful to third parties than to public employers.
While a third party beneficiary action is potentially available to all third
parties who suffer harm from a public employee strike, a different theory of
recovery may be avaliable to a limited class of third parties who have inter-
vened to rectify the harm caused by an illegal public employee strike. This
theory of recovery is an action in quasi-contract. A quasi-contract "is not a
contract at all but an obligation imposed by law to do justice even though it is
clear that no promise was ever made or intended. " 3 " Essentially, a quasi-
contractual obligation arises where one party performs another party's legal
obligation, the second party having failed to discharge this obligation while
knowing that performance of the obligation is of grave public importance. 3"
Moreover, the intervening party must be a proper party to intervene and not a
mere intermeddler. 357
This theory of recovery would be available to third party government en-
3" Police and fire protection are made available to the public at large; "contracts with
water, gas and other utility companies have generally been held to create enforceable rights
in individual consumers." J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, 17-5 at
618-19 (2d ed. 1977).
352 Coffey v. City of Milwaukee, 74 Wis. 2d 526, 540, 247 N.W.2d 132, 139 (1976).
3" See Harvard Note, supra note 44, at 1324.
"4 See supra text and notes at notes 334-40.
355 J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, 5 1-12 at 19 (2d ed. 1977).
356 Rysdam v. School Dist. No. 67, 154 Or. 347, 353, 58 P.2d 614, 616 (1936) (quoting
Sommers v. Putnam County Bd. of Educ., 113 Ohio St. 177, 184, 148 N.E. 682, 684 (1925)).
357 Id.
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tities which, during a strike, provide the services essential to the public safety
or Welfare which normally are provided by the union members. The court in
Kansas City delineated the elements of a quasi-contractual recovery in con-
cluding that: (1) public employee strikes were illegal in Missouri;" 8 (2) the
striking firemen had a legal obligation to provide fire protection to the
citizens; 359 (3) the firemen knowingly and intentionally breached this duty,
knowing that this action would endanger the safety and welfare of the
citizens; 38° (4) the Missouri National Guard had to provide fire protection
services as a direct, proximate and forseeable result of the illegal strike;"' and
(5) in providing these services, the state was not a mere intermeddler. 362 The
court therefore required the union to reimburse the state for costs it incurred by
providing fire protection during the strike."' This type of recovery is by defini-
tion limited to those situations where the strike poses a threat to the citizens and
the third party is the proper party to intervene. Thus, citizens harmed by a
public employee strike normally could not recover in quasi-contract against an
illegally striking public employee union since members of the public probably
would not have the capacity to provide the needed services, and could well be
deemed to be intermeddlers if they did intervene.
Although public employers and third parties will face problems in bring-
ing contract suits against illegally striking public employee unions, the impor-
tance of holding parties responsible for their contractual agreements weighs
strongly in favor of permitting such suits. Public employee unions should not
be permitted to escape liability for damage caused by their breach of an express
or implied promisc'to refrain from striking. If the collective bargaining agree-
ment is to have any meaning at all, the parties to it and the third party
beneficiaries of it must be allowed to sue for enforcement. Furthermore, per-
mitting damage suits for breach of an agreement not to strike should aid the en-
forcement of the strike prohibition by deterring public employee unions from
striking in the future. 384
358 State v. Kansas City Firefighters, Local 42, 2 Pub. Bargaining Cas. (CCH) 41 20,438
at 21,474 (Mo. Cir. Ct. 1976).
358 Id. at 21,475.
'6° Id.
381 Id. at 21,471.
'62 Id.
383 Id.
384 Employers and third parties who succeed in a contract action against a public
employee union may be able to recover punitive as well as contract damages. Punitive damages
;;:generally are not permissible in contract actions. See J. CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF
• CONTRACTS, S 14-3 at 520 (2d ed. 1977). In contract suits brought by private sector employers
pursuant to 5 301 of the LMRA, however, some courts have found that the legislative intent of
preventing strikes in breach of contract and of maintaining labor peace warrants the award of
punitive damages. See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 195-96 (1967) (punitive damages may
be an appropriate remedy in S 301 action); College Hall Fashions, Inc. v. Philadelphia Joint Bd.,
Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 408 F. Supp. 722, 727 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (court found
'4tithorities split on the issue; in this case punitive damages not allowed since would not further
goal of industrial peace because the employees were no longer working for company); Sidney
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CONCLUSION
Public employers and third parties may confront great obstacles to bring-
ing damage suits against public employee unions which have engaged in illegal
strikes. A court's receptiveness to these suits will vary from state to state,
depending on, among other things, state policy toward public employee strikes
and the nature and extent of legislation concerning public employee labor rela-
tions. The courts should not bar such damage suits merely because of the
novelty of the claim. A state which prohibits strikes has made an unequivocal
statement of public policy. The courts should seek to enforce this prohibition,
and provide damage actions to persons and entities injured by illegal strikes.
Regardless of the wisdom or fairness of prohibiting these strikes, until the laws
change, public employee unions should be held accountable for their illegal
acts.
BARBARA J . EGAN
Wanzer & Sons, Inc. v. Milk Drivers Union, Local 753, 249 F. Supp. 664, 671 & n.5 (N.D. Ill.
1966) (punitive damages permissible in 301 action where they will deter future breaches). But
see Local 127, United Shoe Workers v. Brooks Shoe Mfg., Co., 298 F.2d 277, 278 (3d Cir. 1962);
Navajo Freight Lines, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 291 F. Supp. 908, 910 (D. Colo.
1968) (no punitive damages allowed). Depending on the state's policies regarding public
employee strikes and punitive damages in general, a state court similarly might award punitive
damages to a public employer or a third party in a contract suit against a public employee union.
